CRISTO RAUL.ORG

THE FOUNDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE BY WILLIAM I.

BOOK VII.

FIRST YEARS OF THE RULE OF KING WILLIAM I

CHAPTER I.

BEGINNING OF THE REGENCY.

William, Prince of Prussia, was sixty years old, when, in the autumn of 1857, he assumed the control of public affairs, as representative of his royal brother. In later years he used to say often in his homely way, “When I was young I never thought of the possibility of my ascending the throne; I learned then how to command an infantry division properly, but I never troubled myself about affairs of state.” As a matter of fact, the young officer did give himself up to his military duties body and soul, and Prussia gained by it; for under a vigorous leadership the military calling affords an excellent training-school for a future ruler, by accustoming him to quick decision, to firm command, and to unconditional obedience. It is true that his education was, for a long time, somewhat one-sided, but, owing to his earnest industry, it was all the more thorough within its sphere; and thorough work of any sort calls forth all the energies of the mind, making it ready, when the occasion comes, to find itself at home even in unaccustomed occupations, while dilettante buzzing in all directions dissipates the force of the intellect and weakens the judgment.

We have seen how, after such a training, the Prince, having reached maturity, began his political activity; how he retained at all times an independent view of things; how with serious misgiving he gave his approval to the Constitution based upon the Estates; and then how, after the King’s decision had been taken, he entered without weakness or reserve into the new path and allowed himself to be neither led astray nor imbittered by the insults of the Berlin street and newspaper mob in 1848. As we have observed, he had not always been contented with the Prussian policy: he would never have gone to Olmütz, he would never have allowed Prussian troops to leave the field in the presence of the enemy without a fierce contest. Soon after came the Crimean war, and during that the sharp collision with his brother, and the necessity of bearing, with a careless countenance, the blows aimed at him in secret by the ruling party. Thus ripened in the harsh school of life, settled in his political judgment, with an enlarged circle of interests, he now stepped into the most exalted position upon earth, a figure of extraordinary dignity, firm in step, bearing in his face an expression of unsought mastery, of mild earnestness, and of hearty good-will.

Let us try to present to ourselves a little more nearly his personality.

He was a devout Christian, who with simple conviction took his stand on the creed of his forefathers. He was neither a sceptical philosopher, like Frederick the Great, nor a liturgist or theosophist, like Frederick William IV, and he was far from entertaining the idea of becoming a reformer of the Christian churches. His piety was, as the Gospel prescribes in the sixth chapter of Matthew, neither attended with pride nor with a sad countenance, neither dogmatic nor intolerant. But it was the bread of life to him, the consolation of his sorrows, the standard of his actions. There grew up out of his belief an unbounded confidence in God, which filled his whole being and sustained him in all difficulties, quite in the spirit of the old saying: Because I know that I am powerless in God’s hand, I am strong in the face of the world. Thus he was anxiously conscientious in deliberation, but absolutely fearless in danger. It was not mere chivalric courage arising from nervous excitement or from the love of honor; the words fear and danger had for him no meaning at all. He passed through life, never trembling, and never boasting, firm in the even balance of his soul.

He did not belong to the inspired or daemonic natures, which either by supreme spiritual power open new paths for their age, or with irresistible passion hurl down themselves and their people from giddy heights into fearful abysses. He cannot even be called clever, in the sense in which the word can be applied to his elder brother. But, on the other hand, he was, as a contemporary chronicler says in praise of Rudolf von Hapsburg, a man who put things through. His whole nature was directed toward practical action and qualified for it; he had the natural gift of perceiving what was attainable, and an unembarrassed clearness of view, which was shown, above all, in his almost unerring judgment of men. Besides this, he had a rare combination of firmness and flexibility of mind, such as characterizes the statesman as distinguished from the doctrinaire. Until his death he remained unshaken in his conservative principles; yet he recognized, without contradiction, that the means of retaining power must alter with altering conditions, and that progressive reform is the permanent condition on which alone any government can be maintained.

It is unnecessary to say that he was thoroughly convinced of the necessity of a strong monarchy in a country like his own, which had been built up by its kings, which consisted of isolated provinces, and which was surrounded by jealous neighbors. In such a country he felt that there must be a central power guided by decided political traditions, independent of the daily variations of public opinion; the necessity of a change of ministry with every change of the majority in the parliament would be a mortal danger, not only internally to the dignity of the throne, but also to the external safety of the state.

But the Prince was far from deducing from these arguments the necessity of an absolute government. “I will not examine,” he said to King Max of Bavaria, “whether constitutions are good things in themselves. But where they exist they should be maintained, and not falsified by forced interpretations. I have watched long enough the harm done by Manteuffel’s ministry in this way. The constitutional idea, that the measures of the Government should be made public, and that the people are entitled to a share in legislation, has sunk deep into the popular consciousness. To oppose this is very dangerous, since it indicates mistrust of his people on the part of the ruler. Not by restrictions on the Constitution, which imply just such mistrust, but by a wise slackening and tightening of the reins is the power of the Government to be confirmed. The process may be compared to the controlling of the course of a river. The banks must be strengthened, the dikes must be made neither too near nor too far apart, but above all you must not build square across the stream. In England the dikes are too far apart; in Hesse- Cassel and Hanover too near. I hope we shall attain the true mean in Prussia.”

These words contained no political theory. But it would be difficult to depict the obligations of a constitutional ruler with an apter expression or a more liberal sentiment.

Not less decided than his opinion on the constitutional system, was his view in regard to Prussia’s position in Germany.

Like his brother, he was disposed by youthful associations to a warm friendship with the House of Austria; and he was wholly inclined, by reason of his conservative and loyal tendencies, to respect the rights of the other German princes in a very wide interpretation. Only he desired to receive the same consideration that he accorded to others, requiring that Prussia should be regarded as on an equal basis with Austria, and that her honor and the conditions essential to her existence should be respected in the German Confederation: the sacrifice of the interests of his own country to consideration for his brother princes, which Frederick William IV, out of generosity or magnanimity, had so often allowed himself, would to Prince William have been impossible. The weak points of the Constitution of the German Confederation were manifest to him, and from the very first he meditated his proposals for reform, though certainly with little hope himself of a good result. He had learned in the stormy years of the past, that Austria’s opposition and the individualistic tendencies of the Lesser States could not be overcome by parliamentary decrees nor by popular agitation. He saw clearly that a war against Germans must be fought, but only in the case of unjust attacks upon Prussia, and not an offensive war merely with the object of transforming the Confederation; therefore he believed that the realization of German Unity would not come in his time.

As he was on the point of taking the field against the Baden rebels in 1849, he wrote, on the 20th of May, to General von Natzmer: “Whoever aspires to rule over Germany, must seize it for himself; à la Gagern, there is nothing more to be done. Whether the time for this Unity has arrived, God alone knows. That Prussia is destined to stand at the head of Germany, lies written in our whole history — but the when and the how? There is the point.” And again, on the 4th of April, 1851: “Yes, indeed! In November, 1850, we had a second 1818, and perhaps a more exciting one, because it was not a foreign yoke riveted during seven years that had brought about an uprising of the nation; it was a universal feeling that the moment was come when Prussia should possess the position assigned to her by history.—It was not yet time, and I see no prospect of its coming so very soon. The attempt must have been premature, and I think that we shall never see the hoped-for position attained by Prussia.”

Two other expressions of opinion uttered by the Prince may here be given, because, supplementing one another, they complete the full circle of his views in German matters.

A few months after the beginning of the Regency, the German world—we shall soon see for what cause—was in great excitement. The Prince received at that time a visit from the King of Saxony, with whom he was intimately connected by mutual friendship and respect. The King observed that all the German princes were afraid that Prussia would swallow them up. The Prince energetically denied the imputation, calling attention to the often manifested sentiments of his brother and himself. The King cried in reply: “But all the street gamins of Berlin are talking of it.” “Yes,” remarked the Prince, “the street gamins must certainly know more about it than I.” He repeated his assurance, but declared at the same time that it was indispensable that, on the other side, nothing should happen which might threaten the existence of Prussia. “Look here,” said he, and pointed to the position of Hanover on the map, “under no circumstances can I permit a power to arise between my provinces that can possibly take hostile steps against Prussia.”

At the end of January, 1863, he had a long conversation with the English ambassador, Sir Andrew Buchanan, in regard to the affairs of Poland. Buchanan showed him soon afterward his report which was to be sent to London, and the Prince made the following correction: “I did not say that neither I, nor my son, nor my grandson, would see a united Germany; on the contrary, I said that I should probably not live long enough to behold such a thing, but that I surely hoped that the unity would be realized in the time of my son or of my grandson.”

He assigned, then, to the future these German hopes which always stirred his heart and were always held at a distance by his sense of duty, while he applied his whole energy to his immediate preoccupation, the administration of the Prussian Government. The unselfish, unwearied devotion to duty which he displayed in this field till his last breath, till the hour when he spoke those touching words: “I have no time to be tired,”—all had its foundation, like his fearlessness, in the underlying religious element of his nature. Perhaps without knowing the words of his great ancestor, who called himself the first servant of the state, he regarded a ruler as called by God to serve the welfare of his people. In this service he was zealous, but more exacting towards himself than towards others. He entered into business with indefatigable industry; what had formerly been indifferent to him he now strove to learn as belonging to his office, and with what ardor did he learn it!

When the great reform of our jurisprudence was in preparation, he, at seventy years of age, ordered a course upon the general science of law to be read to him; “By no means,” he said, “for the purpose of criticising men of the profession, but that I might understand the explanations in regard to some difficult points, and might have some idea of what was to become law by means of my signature.” After his death numerous closely written sheets were found among his papers, covered with extracts from all branches of the drafts of laws which had been laid before him, and by this means he had made their meaning and importance clear to himself.

In comparison with his brother, his aesthetic interests were naturally limited, and his scientific knowledge by no means extensive, but in these lines also he knew what is incumbent on a king, and under no former government has so much been accomplished in Prussia for art and science, as under his. In this direction, also, the work, undertaken in the beginning from a feeling of duty, soon aroused his receptive mind to sympathy with the object itself. When, on the occasion of some military manoeuvres, he was travelling in the Rhine Province, and the painters of Dusseldorf gave him a brilliant artists’ festival, he wrote to them on the following day these hearty words of thanks: “I was led from the troubles of the present into the past days of Germany tinged with a poetical glamour: I saw myself, after the rough toil of the martial exercises dedicated to the protection of the Fatherland, trans­ported into a fairy realm so cunningly devised, that I could only with difficulty tear myself away from such a kingdom of enchantment.”

With the same penetrating comprehension he studied, further, the plans for the new building in which the Reichstag was to sit; and it is well known how, with his practical insight, he suggested several essential improvements in the same. To his personal decision, made in opposition to the recommendation of his Ministers, the world owes the completion of the excavations at Olympia. And he listened for an hour with lively interest to a report on the historical significance for Art of the Pergamene altar, made to him by the directory of the Museum, which had at once been raised by this valuable antique to the position of an institution of European importance. Thus it was in all branches: his life was work, work in every department of the administration, work for the happiness of others.

Wherever he felt there was occasion, he was ready to display royal pomp in full measure; but in his own habits he was extremely moderate and simple, a veteran soldier, and a frugal manager. His personal relations were at all times distinguished by cordial friendliness tempered by kingly dignity; he was anxious to communicate the quiet cheerfulness of his own spirit to all about him. For the opponents of his policy he had always the lofty maxim: to forget nothing and to forgive everything; when he had once given his friendship, he remained unalterably faithful; and in his heart that source of the purest joy that is given to mortal man, the joy of making others happy, never failed.

When, twenty years later, he stood on the pinnacle of power and greatness, and an abandoned criminal had dared to try to assassinate him, the first and most trusted of his servants could say of him,“ Here we have an old man, one of the best men on earth, and yet his life is aimed at. There never was a man of a more modest, more noble, and more humane disposition than the Emperor. He is totally different from men born to such a lofty station, or from the greater part of them. They lay little stress upon the feelings and wishes of others; they think that much is permitted to men of their caste; their whole education seems aimed at stifling the human side in their natures. The Emperor does not regard himself as any such Olympian; on the contrary, he is a man in every respect, and bows himself to every human obligation. He has never in his life done injustice to any one, never hurt any one’s feelings, never been guilty of an act of harshness. He is one of those men whose amiable disposition wins the heart; he is constantly occupied with the welfare of those about him, and of his subjects, and is endowed with all the high qualities of a Prince and with all the virtues of a private man. It is impossible to conceive a finer and more beneficent type of gentleman.”

The task that fell to the Prince in 1857, that of governing according to the intentions of his brother, was neither easy nor agreeable. As his own intentions had a very different direction, great self-denial was required for him to adapt himself to his brother’s purposes. This he practised, with his usual uprightness, to its fullest extent. That he would leave his brother’s Ministers quietly in possession of their offices, was to be expected; but the extent to which he carried the observation of this rule, even into the minutest details, is shown by a single example. A litterateur of bad reputation, Lindenberg by name, had shortly before been guilty of wretched intrigues against the Prince, but on an influential recommendation the King had held out to him the prospect of a petty office in Posen. The patent now came up for confirmation, and the Prince signed it without changing countenance.

In the beginning of the year 1858, the Government by Deputy was extended for another three months, though, indeed, all hope of the King’s recovery had even then vanished. A meeting of the Parliament was near at hand; and the Minister of Justice, Simons, was in doubt whether a government by deputy so long continued was constitutional, and whether the regency prescribed by the Constitution in the case of permanent incapacity on the part of the King ought not now to be established. It was, indeed, well known that at the King's Court at Sans Souci a great repugnance to this plan prevailed. Queen Elizabeth, who watched over her husband with devoted self-sacrifice, feared that such a course would produce a bad effect on the condition of her patient. The leaders of the “Kreuzzeitung” party, hitherto the trusted supporters of the King, the Gerlachs, the Uhdens, the Gotzes, feared lest an administration of the Prince should bring about a change of policy and the loss of their influence. It was said among them, that he must be a bad Royalist, who would dispute the King’s right to do what was in the power of every property-holder, to choose his own administrator.

In view of this fine theory, Simons laid before his colleagues an opinion given by Friedberg, the late Minister, which declared the Regency necessary. He then, as a sort of middle course, proposed that the King should issue a decree, out of his own sovereign right, inviting the Prince to assume the Regency; upon this, the Prince should issue a decree, declaring himself ready to undertake the office, in consideration of his right as heir; and finally the Parliamentary proceedings prescribed by the Constitution should take place. But this was zealously opposed by the Ministers of the Interior and of Education, Westphalen and Raumer; and therefore Manteuffel, though himself agreeing with Simons, let the matter drop.

The Prince, who likewise expected that the Regency would begin in April, had meanwhile, with this idea, meditated a transformation of the Ministry; and as he disapproved of the men of the “Kreuzzeitung,” he had cast his eye on the former Minister of Finance, von Alvensleben-Erxleben, a strongly conservative official of considerable information and insight, as we have seen in his work at the Dresden Conference. By him the Representative in the Diet, Von Bismarck, was sug­gested as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Prince, who had long ago become convinced that Bismarck had grown far beyond the range of vision of the “Kreuzzeitung,” agreed, and Bismarck also declared his willingness to accept. But before the end of March, Alvensleben died after a short illness, and on this the whole plan fell to the ground. Under these circumstances the Prince accepted the prolongation of the Government by Deputy without opposition; and contrary to all anticipation, the Parliament passed over the question in silence. The feudal party had, for the present, accomplished their desires; but the Prince could not but see in their behavior a fresh personal slight, and he turned all the more decidedly to their opponents, at least to those of them whom he could count upon as cherishing monarchical sentiments.

His confidence, at this time, was placed chiefly in Herr Rudolf von Auerswald, a man of single mind and of warm love for his Fatherland, combining devoted loyalty to his King with moderately liberal principles, by his temperament more inclined to conciliatory than to radical measures, in the strife of party more ready to see the points of resemblance than of difference, and in every negotiation anxious for concession and agreement. His connection with the Prince dated from their boyhood, from the time of the exile to Konigsberg, after the Peace of Tilsit. Auerswald, while Minister in the summer of 1848, had boldly defended the rights of the Prussian Crown against the encroachments of the Diet at Frankfort and of the Prussian Parliament; but in 1852 he had been removed from his position at the head of the administration of the Rhine Province, on account of his opposition to the “feudal” policy of the Minister Westphalen. During this whole time the Prince’s affection for him had been unchanged. In the summer of 1858 the Prince invited him to make him a long visit at Baden-Baden; and there they came to the decision, not to allow the existing Ministry to remain any longer in office than was absolutely necessary.

The advice of Baron von Schleinitz was to the same effect. This nobleman had been Minister of Foreign Affairs under Count Brandenburg; and his brilliant conversation and attractive manner had made him, since 1849, an always welcome guest at the Court of the Prince and Princess of Prussia. In politics he was without very decided opinions, as a diplomatist not unskilful, but incapable of independent decisions and lacking in firmness; his effort was always to avoid difficulties, rather than to overcome them, to maintain Prussia’s position as far as possible, but, above all things, to proceed by mutual concession, and, especially, never to come to an open breach with Austria. He now proposed that the Prince, after the dismissal of the existing Ministry, should form his Cabinet of new men, as yet free from political hostility, and should, therefore, give up all thought of himself and Auerswald. No decision in the matter was reached at that time; but for the position of official President of the future Ministry, Prince Anton von Hohenzollern was proposed, a man of patriotic spirit and of upright and honorable character.

Meanwhile another prolongation of the Government by Deputy had been brought about, as if it were the most harmless thing in the world. The feudal party, seeing that the Prince was reluctant to act, grew so confident that they publicly declared that any one would be an enemy of the King, who should venture to propose a Regency in any case; for it was an inherent right of the Prussian Crown to appoint a representative according to its own pleasure, a right which could not be limited by the articles of a Constitution on paper.

But the hour that was to awake them from their dreams was at hand. The patience of the Prince at length became exhausted ; and, on the 8th of August, he required of the Ministry an opinion, as to whether the existing state of things could be prolonged any further without infringing the Constitution. The crisis was all the more urgent, as the parliamentary period was coming to an end, and a general election was imminent. The Ministry held several councils to consider the question. Herr von Westphalen, for the above-mentioned reasons, persisted in advising a rejection of the Regency, and proposed, at least, a postponement of the matter till after the elections should be completed. The two Ministers von Manteuffel declared themselves emphatically on the other side, urging that it would be simply abominable to hold out as a party cry for the approaching electoral contest the question of “King, or Regent,” which had already been hotly discussed by the Press. The majority concurred in this view; and the Report of the Ministry decided, on the 6th of September, for the Constitutional necessity of a Regency, and for the establishment of the same by the methods proposed by the Minister of Justice.

A few more weeks of consideration elapsed. The Prince, in his conscientiousness, weighed unceasingly his duties towards the State, towards his brother, and towards himself. The nearer the hour of decision came, the greater did he find the burden of the responsibility resting upon him. He sought a personal interview with the Queen, but this was prevented by an accident. Manteuffel also failed in obtaining an audience from the Queen, though he twice requested it. On the 20th of September, the Prince held a council of the entire Ministry, when Simons and Westphalen once more discussed the pro and contra, while the Prince himself expressed no opinion; but immediately afterwards he informed the Queen that he shared the view of the Majority. She was obliged to yield to the inevitable, and sent word by the Minister of the Household, Von Massow, to his colleagues, that, although in great anxiety, she was ready to lay the question of the Regency before the King; but if it injured his health, the Ministry must bear the. responsibility.

An anxious moment followed. By the advice of his physicians, it was decided that the King should pass the winter in Italy. On a day when his mind was clear, on the 7th of October, the Queen told him that, as they were preparing for a somewhat lengthy absence, the Prince must receive fuller powers, and become Regent. The King calmly expressed his assent, and she therefore brought him the document to sign. The King read it in silence, and signed it, still without uttering a word; then he covered his face with his hands, burst into a flood of tears, and left the room.

Thereupon the Prince wrote to his wife, “The deci­sive step has thus been taken. May God give his blessing to the solemn work which now begins for the Fatherland by my hands! You can imagine in what a state of excitement I am, and how I could only strengthen and confirm myself by prayer, and recommend myself to the gracious goodness of God! ” He then related to her the course things had taken, and added, “Although by this a burden is lifted from the hearts of so many, for me now first begins the real care and trouble, which is hardly likely (considering the improbability of the King’s recovery) to be taken from me again. I close with the request that you will pray for me and for the Fatherland, and for the royal pair in their grievous sorrow.

                    Your affectionate

                                                  William.”

The royal proclamation which summoned the Prince to assume the Regency was made public on the following day. The first measure of the Prince was the immediate dismissal of Westphalen, and the invitation of President von Flottwell, a worthy and much-respected public servant, though now somewhat feeble with age, to take his place.

Not with a light heart, but with firm determination, the Prince began his government, which was to be on its own basis from this time forth. Even before the end of October he summoned the Parliament for the recognition of the Regency, and took the oath to respect the Constitution. He pronounced the words in solemn earnest, although more than one provision of the Constitution had been long ago regarded by him with anxiety.

He intended then, as he once wrote afterwards to the Grand Duke of Weimar, to show the world that it was possible to govern, even under an objectionable constitution, if one only remained firm upon a conservative basis, and chose honorable men as helpers in carrying out one’s system. He had now finally decided upon a Hohenzollern-Auerswald Ministry, and in this combination there was certainly no place for Bismarck. Ministers of special departments without pronounced political tendencies were Herr von Flottwell, Herr von Schleinitz, and the Minister of War, General von Bonin, the Prince’s fellow-sufferer in the disgrace of 1854. The party of the Preussisches Wochenblatt supplied Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg as Minister of Education, and Count Pückler as Minister of Agriculture. The Department of Finance was offered to the President of the Board of Commerce, Otto Camphausen, younger brother of Ludolf; but he declined on some technical pretext, because he had no confidence in either the strength or the permanence of the Cabinet. At his suggestion, Auerswald invited to Berlin Herr von Patow, a leader of the Liberal opposition against Manteuffel.

Shortly before, on the 30th of October, the Ministers then in office had sent the Regent a memorial, in which they explained that it was necessary, for the good of the State, that they should retain their places, but the Regent had left the communication for a time unanswered. But now that, on the 4th of November, an understanding with Patow had been reached, the former Ministers were to be told, in reply, that Prince Hohenzollern had formed a new Cabinet, and that the Departments of Trade and Justice, hitherto controlled by Herren von der Heydt and Simons, would for the time be managed by the under-secretaries of those offices.

But suddenly a new difficulty arose. Herr von Patow, during the negotiation which had been carried on with him, had suggested that he doubted whether the King would approve of his being appointed. This caused the Prince a sleepless night. He asked himself whether Patow was not too liberal, and on the following morning he announced that he did not wish to have him as Minister. For a few hours the state of things was critical, till Auerswald’s talent for adjusting difficulties again displayed itself. Patow was notified of his appointment in the evening, after the Prince had consented to retain the two former Ministers, Von der Heydt and Simons, so bringing about a strengthening of the conservative element, and a restoration of continuity with the old Ministry.

I have related these particulars thus in detail, because they bring the intentions of the Regent into even clearer light than does the solemn declaration with which he opened the first session of the new Cabinet on the 8th of November. But in this also he announced emphatically, that there was not then, and never would be, any question of a break with the past, but that only a careful and improving hand was to be laid where anything arbitrary or unsuited to the time might show itself. The welfare of the Crown and of the Nation were inseparable, and must rest on a conservative basis. The Government must not let itself be urged by so-called liberal, but in fact exaggerated, ideas, into a shadowy region of uncertainty; true political wisdom was founded in an accurate knowledge of existing needs, in honesty of purpose, in respect for the laws, and in consistency; by means of these a Government was strong, because it had a clear conscience, and had thus right on its side in opposition to everything evil.

But when the Regent touched upon the different branches of the administration, the methods of the former Government were subjected to so searching a criticism in several directions, and especially the amalgamation of political and ecclesiastical interests was judged with such severity, as begetting not piety, but hypocrisy, that the feeling spread far and wide through the country that a new day had dawned for Prussia, and the Hohenzollern Cabinet received among the people the title of “Ministry of the new era.” Less attention was paid to the Regent’s words in regard to the pressing necessity of an improvement, even though costly, in the condition of the army. In what concerned foreign politics he contented himself with the statement of a few general objects to be aimed at. He should seek peace and friendship with all the Great Powers, but there was to be no limiting of Prussia’s independence by premature agreements. In Germany Prussia had moral conquests to make by the wisdom of her own legislation and by the employment of various means tending toward unity; for instance, of the Tariff-Union, which, however, certainly needed reform. The world must learn that Prussia was ready everywhere to defend the right. All these statements, regarded generally, as they appeared in this speech, seem partly meaningless and partly dangerous; but in the intention of the Regent, they all had their application to German questions then hanging in the balance, and we shall soon see how justly and accurately they were adapted to these.

The establishment of the new Ministry with some Liberal names connected with it soon had a great effect, both far and near. In Munich a sharp struggle between the Government and the Second Chamber had been long going on, and was constantly increasing in bitterness, so that, with the consent of the King, the Ministers, Von der Pfordten and Count Reigersberg, the one led by his sanguinary, and the other by his arbitrary, disposition, began to meditate a small coup d’état, dissolution of the Chamber, proclamation of a new electoral law, and the other usual accompaniments of such a means of salvation. Evidently it was necessary to stop all this when the Prussian crisis came: with a Liberal movement going on in Prussia, an infringement of the Constitution in Bavaria was quite out of the question. But then the Bavarian Ambassador in Berlin sent most joyful news: the Manteuffel Ministry stood firmer than ever; he had learned it in the last days of October, from the very best sources, naturally from Herr von Manteuffel himself.

After this, the appointment of Hohenzollern came to Munich like lightning from a clear sky. Pfordten hastened to the King; after long deliberations, continued during several months, the unavoidable decision was reached, that on certain points concessions must be made to the Chamber. “But how is that possible,” the King then exclaimed, “after all that has passed, without a humiliation of the Crown?”— “Nothing is simpler,” replied the imperturbable Pfordten; “Your Majesty puts forth a manifesto: My Ministers have latterly had various difference with the Chambers, but I am determined to be at peace with my people”

The plan was adopted; and Pfordten gave up his position to the Representative in the Diet, Baron von Schrenck. The sentence devised by the Minister who had advocated the coup d’état—“I am determined to be at peace with my people”—became a popular watchword which, in the midst of the ensuing constitutional complications in Prussia, was pointed at by every Bavarian with patriotic pride, and without the slightest suspicion that Bavaria’s undeniably great glory, never to have had her Constitution infringed, was mainly owing to the Prince of Prussia.

In Prussia itself the dawn of the new era was greeted by the great majority of the people with a delight before which the angry apprehension of the feudal party and the studied indifference of the Democrats sank into insignificance. It is characteristic of this agita­tion, that people’s minds were filled with exuberant hopes of universal happiness, but there was no trace of the usual radical or republican ideals. At the beginning of the general elections to the Parliament, the programmes announced contained the exact contrary of what had been customary with the preceding admin­istration: they were directed especially against the points on which the pressure of the old system had been most severely felt, against political arbitrariness, against the equivocal interpretation of the laws, against ecclesiastical narrowness and love of persecution, against party-favoring of manorial proprietors, and against the violent influencing of Parliamentary elections. All this, compared with the Regent’s speech, could certainly be regarded as an intensified echo of the same.

Another not less significant characteristic in this electoral agitation was the ready assent which was yielded, when the Ministers publicly announced that the removal of abuses that had endured for years was not an easy task, that it was much more difficult to realize even reasonable desires than to express them, and that the country must, therefore, give the Government its confidence, and not increase the difficulty of its task by being overanxious to accomplish something. Every one was willing to agree to this; the caution, “only do not urge things too much,” became a watchword of the Liberal party. Everywhere the tone was given by the leaders of the old Liberal school. The object was to get rid of the feudal opponents of the Government, but not to cause embarrassment by the election of Radicals; and the result was a thorough defeat of the feudal party, a complete exclusion of the Democrats, and an overwhelming majority for the new Ministry. For the first time since the beginning of constitutional government in Germany, Liberal electors and representatives counted it an honor to be called the Ministerial party.

There were, indeed, exceptions to this feeling, even among the prominent Liberals; there were men who, in view of the different elements in the new Cabinet, could not feel secure. Georg von Vincke observed casually that the Parliament must keep a doubly careful watch on a popular Ministry, and Count Schwerin declared to his constituents that he was a warm friend of the Ministry, yet that he could make no decisions at their nod, but must act on his own independent conviction in every particular case. He did not then know that in a few months he would be Minister himself. But in spite of these few individuals, the Prussian nation in general was strong in the feeling that the new era was a liberal one, and that any lack of harmony between the Ministry and the representatives of the people was out of the question.

The Prince Regent could not, at any rate, help being pleased with all this evidence of approval of his Ministry. But the very disproportion of the result obtained at once raised doubts in his prudent mind as to the permanence of the general joy, and called forth, at the same time, the question, how far it would be possible to justify expectations so highly raised.

Influences of another sort were at work upon his decisions in regard to foreign politics. We must here return once more to the summer of 1858, to the days of the Prince’s stay at Baden-Baden.

As we have seen, the Crimean War had left many problems unsolved, in the discussion of which the Great Powers separated into two parties, Austria and England on one side, France, Russia, and Prussia on the other. This dispute occupied at that time the stage of Europe, and everywhere a feeling of oppression prevailed, that seemed to forebode a storm. The alliance of the three Eastern Powers, which, since 1815, had secured the condition of Europe according to the stipulations of treaties, was now thoroughly dissolved; in regard to the future designs of the French upstart, who had so suddenly raised himself to the pinnacle of the continent, an anxious uncertainty prevailed, which was not at all diminished by the fact that Bismarck’s view, expressed in 1856, that Napoleon was thinking of directing his immediate action against Austria’s supremacy in Italy, was now very widely held.

Cavour was at Baden-Baden in the summer of 1858, and there talked with the Prussian statesmen, though with a confidence that had some reservations. He said that he had just discussed the condition of Italy with Napoleon at Plombières. The Emperor was not wholly free to act in the matter, as he had to take into consideration the French clergy and their sympathy with the Pope, and consequently with Austria; but this much was certain, that in case of a break between Sardinia and Austria, Napoleon would be found on the side of Sardinia. A Russian diplomat, Herr von Balabin, who was present, observed on this, “ If you march, the Rus­sian Guard will march also.” The Prince of Prussia, to whom the Sardinian statesman described the melancholy condition of Italy, had no hesitation in declaring to him his readiness to co-operate for the amelioration of the same, though in doing this he certainly had no other thought in mind than a reform of the partly stagnant and partly despotic administration of the Italian countries. In every respect, Austria’s position was by no means an agreeable one. France in covert, and soon, perhaps, open hostility; Russia in a state of unfeigned and bitter anger; Prussia sorely irritated by the Neuchâtel affair, and by German matters in general, and very near an open breach,—such was the state of Europe during the government of the Prince of Prussia as Deputy.

It was natural that every friend of Austria’s should look upon a restoration of the good understanding between the two German Great Powers as the most effective means of protection against all these dangers, and should desire to see such a restoration brought about. In the first rank of those who held this view stood England; that is to say, both the Tory Ministry of Lord Derby, and Queen Victoria with the Prince Consort personally as well. The Royal Personages had just entered into close family connection with the Prince and Princess of Prussia, through the marriage of their children, Prince Frederick William, and the Princess Royal, Victoria (January 17th, 1858); and by this, between the two mothers especially, a bond of warm friendship had been established. Soon after the betrothal of the young couple, the Princess of Prussia wrote, on the 12th of April, 1856, to the Duke of Coburg, “ May God bless this union for the dear chil­dren, for our family, and for the poor German Fatherland, which, in the nature of things, can only be raised from its present condition through an alliance with England.”

But in 1858 alliance with England meant nothing less than friendship with Austria. The movement in this direction was seconded also by King Leopold I of Belgium, who in former times had thought himself out of favor with the Prussian Court, and for this reason had attached himself firmly to Austria, but who now looked with anxious suspicion on his dangerous neighbor in the Tuileries, and exerted all his diplomatic influence for the controlling of French ambition, and consequently for a firm accord between Austria and Prussia. Besides this, there were the efforts of the South German Kings, whose hearts sank within them at the horrible thought of a war between France and Austria, and who therefore, for the time, looked upon the otherwise not undesirable coldness between the German Powers as the acme of misfortune. The King of Würtemberg went himself to Baden-Baden, to use his personal influence with the Prince of Prussia in this direction.

Among those about the Prince, Herr von Schleinitz was disposed, as always before, to speak in favor of harmony between the two States. Herr von Auerswald was not strongly inclined to the yellow and black, but thought peace with Austria more desirable than terms of hostility. The Prince had no objection to make, but felt that, for the time, in the settlement of the pending difficulties, everything depended on a favorable disposition on the part of Austria, and that there had as yet been no sign anywhere of anything of the sort. Out of the dispute in regard to the Rastadt garrison there had again arisen, as we have seen, the dangerous question as to whether the matter could be decided by a majority-vote in the Diet, or whether unanimity was required. Bismarck had been anxious that the protest against deciding the matter by a majority should be accompanied by a threat of withholding Prussia’s contribution; and Manteuffel, though he had erased the threat, had sent the protest in its full energy to Vienna. Then came the further news, that Austria continued firm in her intention, on the expiration of the Tariff-Union, which was now near at hand, either to enter the same, or to form a Tariff- Union on her own account with South Germany, and thus, in any case, to break up the Prussian hegemony in this direction also.

Such methods were not likely to increase the friendly feeling of Prussia, and, in consequence, the Prince was not at all disposed to listen to the following offer, with which, at the end of June, the Imperial Court surprised the Prussian Cabinet: that some Prussian battalions should be admitted into Rastadt, if Prussia would promise, as in 1854, to guarantee to Austria all the latter’s German and non-German possessions,—very much as if an elderly lady should write to a young friend that she would give him a fine puppy-dog, but expected that he would marry her in return. It is hardly necessary to say that the Prince declared very decidedly, that he hoped for a good understanding with Austria, but that he was not willing to bind himself by too hasty agreements. Schleinitz’s mild advice to the Prince fell, therefore, on stony ground; and the latter summoned Bismarck three times to Baden-Baden, and even consented that Manteuffel should take up his abode there for a few weeks.

For in July a special occasion called for important and vigorous action on the part of the Confederate Diet. Since the beginning of 1857 the Assembly had been occupied with a complaint made by the Holstein Estates—we will return later to the details of the matter—on account of the action taken in contradiction to constitutions and treaties by the Danish King against the Duchies. After long deliberation, and much writing hither and thither, the Diet in February finally passed decrees which imposed definite requirements on Denmark. The latter took time for her answer, and at length, on the 15th of July, declared herself prepared, not indeed to fulfil the requirements, but to negotiate about them, as had been done six years before. Austria, considering her former friendship with Denmark, and the South German Governments, following in Austria’s train, declared themselves perfectly satisfied.

At this point, however, the Prince of Prussia interfered decidedly. On the first rumor of the Danish answer he telegraphed to Berlin that it was insufficient, that the Diet must resolve on energetic measures, and that Prussia must take the initiative in them. It was the memory of Olmütz that now burned within him; it was the feeling that had made him say, on the 8th of November, that Prussia was always ready to defend the right. Bismarck was summoned to Baden, the Prince came to an agreement with him in regard to the course to be followed in the Diet, and in a few weeks a decree of the Diet was drawn up, which threatened the King-Duke with chastisement if he remained obstinate.

The Rastadt difficulty was settled by a compromise toward the end of the year, and thus the outward harmony between the two Great Powers was restored. More than this was not accomplished. The Prince Regent persisted in his determination to keep his hands free, as far as any obligation to Austria was concerned.

Only too soon, however, events occurred which rendered it necessary not only to avoid rash obligations, but to adopt a positive policy. The Regency was exposed to a severe trial on the very threshold of its activity.

FRANCO-SARDINIAN ALLIANCE.

CHAPTER II.

THE ITALIAN WAR.

On the 1st of January, 1859, the Emperor Napoleon, at the formal audience of congratulation, said to the Austrian Ambassador, “I regret that the relations between our Governments are no longer so good as formerly, but I beg you to assure your Emperor that my personal respect for him remains unaltered.”

These words echoed like a thunder-clap through all Europe. Every one took them as the forerunners of a declaration of war. The rates fell in all the Exchanges.

Nor was every one in the wrong, though Napoleon shortly afterwards expressed his wonder that there should have been such a misunderstanding. He said that, on the contrary, he had declared that in spite of some difficulties, his peaceful disposition toward the Emperor Francis Joseph was unaltered.

As a matter of fact, he had come to an understand­ing with Cavour in regard to a war against Austria. It had been settled at Plombières that the Sardinian King, Victor Emanuel, should have Lombardo-Venetia, Parma, and Modena, while France, in return for assistance rendered, should receive Savoy and Nice. As a pledge of this alliance, the cousin of the Emperor, Jerome Napoleon, was to marry a daughter of the King. The question of how Italian affairs were to be arranged after the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy, was, for the present, left to the course of events. Napoleon thought of an Italian Confederation under the honorary presidency of the Pope; and Cavour made no objection to this, provided no foreign prince should be numbered among the members of the Confederation.

As for the bringing on of the war, there was naturally no intention of provoking Europe by announcing off-hand the overthrow of the territorial conditions established by the compacts of 1815; on the contrary, the proceedings were to be based firmly on the ground of these compacts. Napoleon would first propose to the Court of Vienna that the Pope should be urged to reforms in the Papal States, as a consequence of which the French and Austrian garrisons there should become unnecessary. Then Austria, the great stickler for formal legality, Austria herself would be accused of a breach of the compacts of 1815. These had proclaimed the sovereign independence of the Italian States; and now Austria had concluded alliances with many of these States, by which powerful influence upon the internal affairs of those States was conceded to the Court of Vienna, and their independence, consequently, seriously trenched upon. On this point, then, it was proposed to take a stand, and, on the ground of the Act of the Vienna Congress, to demand that these unauthorized alliances should be given up; in case of a refusal, an eminently proper excuse for a declaration of war would be provided.

The refutation of this argument would certainly not have been difficult. If those Italian States were independent, they clearly had the right to purchase Austria’s powerful protection by certain limitations of their own supreme authority. But, unfortunately, this reply, in itself decisive, could have but little effect in the mouth of Austria, since in 1850 she had used against Prussia exactly the same argument that France was now trying to bring forward: she had then said that because the Act of Confederation proclaimed the German princes to be sovereign, it was not allowable for those princes to resign certain of their rights of supremacy to Prussia, as Head of the Union.

While Napoleon was silently preparing this diplomatic machinery, Cavour and the National League had been occupied, during the whole autumn, in arousing the popular feeling. In all parts of the Peninsula arose the cry that Italy must be freed from the yoke of the foreign oppressor, and that the severed members of the Fatherland must be united. The Press, the debates in the Chambers, the League, all worked together, and with the greatest indifference to precaution or concealment, for one object: to harass the enemy in Vienna, and to provoke him to unguarded steps.

This effort succeeded to their wish, and even beyond. In Vienna there was great indignation. The slightest concession was thought incompatible with the dignity of the Empire. The Government did not, indeed, wish to attack, but they longed for the moment when the enemy would offer them an occasion, that they might seize it and strike a decisive blow. An Austrian statesman said to Herr von Bismarck, “Since Sardinia has become a constitutional state, our offi­cials have found any systematic administration in Lombardy impossible; it is for us a matter of life and death that we should compel Sardinia to get rid of her Constitution, and renounce ideas of Italian Unity.” Just in the same way had Metternich called the idea of German Unity abominable, and Schwarzenberg used every effort for the overthrow of the Constitution in Berlin. Certainly it is neither an imposing nor a safe position, when one is obliged to regard the misery of one’s neighbors as a necessary condition of one’s own existence.

However, things had been developing in this direction for more than a century, and the Court of Vienna longed for war with no less passion than did that of Turin. Hardly had Napoleon’s New Year’s greeting resounded through Europe, when Austria threw thirty thousand men into Lombardy, and added re-enforcements week by week. Upon this, Sardinia naturally declared herself threatened by such an accumulation of troops upon her borders, began to make preparations on her side, of course, only for defence, and, to Austria’s infinite disgust, called to her banner volunteers from all Italy, who then formed a special division of the army, under the great revolutionary leader, Garibaldi.

This time the Court of Vienna was led to make use of popular agitation, however little such a course was adapted to its usual political methods. But in this connection everything depended upon obtaining the help of the German Confederation; for the announcement that such help was to be given might perhaps avert the French attack altogether, and would, at any rate, draw the French army to the Rhine, and keep it away from Italy. While, therefore, the Imperial diplomats were moving heaven and earth in their effort to represent to the Princes that the support of the leading Power of Germany was a self-evident patriotic duty, in which assertion they were readily listened to by the majority, in the South German Press the watchword resounded day after day, that the ancient enemy should be crushed with Germany’s united strength. Never must that happen again which had happened in 1805 and 1807, that Prussia should leave her Austrian brothers in the lurch, and then, after a short interval, be herself destroyed in her isolation. If Austria was attacked in Italy, Germany was also indirectly threatened thereby, for the Rhine could not be defended without the possession of the Po. The French despot had stifled all freedom in his own dominions; now he was attempting to transplant, not freedom, but revolution, into other countries, exactly as former Kings had burned Protestants at home, and supported them abroad against Emperor and Church, by this means succeeding in robbing the Empire of Alsace and Lorraine. Whoever should be a laggard in this holy war would betray the Fatherland, and assist in dismembering the German Nation. Such words were thundered forth in Munich and in Augsburg, in Stuttgart and in Darmstadt; with noisy terrorism every opposing opinion was crushed, and the Governments were unceasingly urged to speedy armament. The effect was great; the hearts of the South German people were set on fire. Never since 1848 had German honor and German unity been so highly cried up as in this newspaper storm which had its origin in the Vienna Press.

Quite different was the feeling in the North of Germany. There neither Schleswig-Holstein, nor Olmütz, nor the dangerous crisis in the matter of the Tariff-Union, had been forgotten. Among the great majority of the Prussian people liberal sentiments and the desire of national unity carried in their train a dislike of Austria, while Italy’s efforts towards freedom and unity found a lively sympathy. Moreover, Napoleon’s cleverly calculated attitude contributed to confirm the public opinion of Prussia in this tendency. In marked contrast to the war enthusiasm in Austria, there was in France no talk of serious military preparations. A small army was assembled on the frontiers of Savoy; but, apart from this, profound peace reigned in the country, and the fleet lay unprepared in the harbor of Toulon. The Prussian Government, therefore, saw in this state of affairs no occasion for warlike decisions. Even supposing that, for not unnatural reasons, a violent excitement arose in Piedmont, the little State would not venture to take up arms without Napoleon’s aid; and Napoleon had hitherto demanded nothing further than that, on the basis of the compacts of 1815, there should be an improvement in the state of things in Italy,—a state of things which, in Prussia’s judgment also, had become intolerable.

The Prince Regent, consequently, had not a moment’s hesitation in deciding that, so far as could be seen at that time, the German Confederation had nothing at all to do with the matter, and hence that Prussia would take part in the negotiations, not as a member of the Confederation, but independently as a European Power. Herr von Schleinitz, in spite of his friendship for Austria, was above all an enemy of critical, and possibly dangerous, decisions, and did everything in his power to confirm his master in the view the latter had adopted. In the Confederate Diet, Bismarck gave place to Herr von Usedom, a sympathizer with the new era, in order that the former might represent Prussia at St. Petersburg. These two gentlemen were not overfond of each other m general, but agreed entirely in regard to the matter then in hand, Bismarck looking upon Austria as the chief opponent of Prussia, while Usedom was enthusiastic for the independence of Italy. Such opinions as these were generally held in Berlin among the leaders and the majority of the deputies; no one had any desire to break a lance for Austria’s misrule in Italy, or in defence of the Curia.

As for the other two neutral Great Powers, Russia and England, there was in St. Petersburg only one feeling,—delight at the prospect of a humiliation of Austrian pride; and this feeling prevailed to such a degree that the Emperor Alexander did not conceal his intention of himself opposing any one who should show a readiness to assist Austria. In England the predominant feeling was a desire for peace; though the Tory party then in power inclined rather to the Austrian side, while the Whigs distinctly favored the cause of the Italian patriots. The Minister, Lord Malmesbury, at once made an attempt at mediation, order­ing the English Ambassador at Paris, Lord Cowley, to go to Vienna, and there to urge emphatically a con­sideration of the French proposals for internal reform in Italy. The Ambassador was received with the words, “We need no mediators, but allies.” His proposals to guarantee to Austria the possession of the territory she then held, provided she would agree to the reforms, was received with an answer half accept­ing and half evading.

But before the negotiation had resulted in anything definite, it was thwarted by a proposition coming from Russia, that the affairs of Italy should be arranged at a Congress of the Great Powers, to which representatives of the Italian States should be admitted. The proposal was accepted by France with eagerness, and by England and Prussia without hesitation, but in Austria it aroused the bitterest indignation. What! Were they to condescend to appear before the tribunal of the European Powers, in name, indeed, as equal among equals, but in fact as defendants against the detested Sardinia? Were they to allow strangers to interfere in their sovereign rights, which had been created by Europe, and exercised for a generation? “I would rather go to the gallows than to this Conference,” is said to have been the exclamation of Count Buol.

The proposal was not rejected in so many words, but delays were introduced in matters of detail, first in regard to the meeting-place of the Congress, and then in regard to its preliminaries. All negotiation was declared impossible so long as Sardinia did not dismiss Garibaldi’s volunteers, and place its army on a peace-footing. Austria would then disarm as well, and take part in the Congress. Russia and Eng­land thought that Piedmont was much more threatened by the force of its enemy, which was double its own, than was Austria by the small army of the Piedmontese. They therefore proposed mutual disarmament. Napoleon all the time kept up a peaceful appearance, accepted every proposal of mediation, and troubled Cavour not a little by this boundless submissiveness; but at the same time the Emperor whispered in the ear of the Sardinian Ambassador, “Do not be anxious; all this will come to nothing.”

He had judged the Austrian Cabinet rightly. Count Buol did, indeed, begin to hesitate a little, in the fear of taking some false step, which might turn the favor of Europe towards his opponent. But the decision lay no longer in his hand. The leaders of the officers of high rank and of the clergy, the Head of the Ministry of War, Count Grünne, and the Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Rauscher, urged the Emperor not only to reject every thought of concession, but to begin as soon as possible the Holy War against Revolution as proclaimed openly in Berlin, and as hypocritically veiled in Paris. Every day there was an increasing impatience to turn to account the preparations which had been so energetically begun, and which were so exhaustive for the severely taxed Treasury, and to crush Sardinia before the French military arrangements could be completed.

The Archduke Albert came to Berlin to give assur­ance of the love of peace which animated his Court, and to hold out the prospect, in case of war, of the appearance on the Rhine of an Austrian army of two hundred and fifty thousand men, under the Emperor in person, requesting at the same time a similar manifestation on the part of Prussia and the German Confederation. But when asked the object of such a war, and some more particular questions about its management, he had nothing to answer, and therefore the Prussian reply was non-committal.

Nevertheless, at this very moment the rage for war at Vienna broke through all bounds. Yet once more Count Buol uttered a warning, and delayed the momentous step for three days; but then the decision was given against him, so that he presented his resignation, and was soon afterwards replaced by the Repre­sentative to the Diet, Count Rechberg. Thereupon, on the 28d of April, an Austrian officer appeared in Turin with the ultimatum, either complete disarmament or war within three days. Cavour breathed again. He sent back the envoy with the answer that the question of disarmament could only be decided with that of the Congress. He knew now that all Europe would lay the blame of the breach of the peace upon Austria. And so it was. In England, where, hitherto, Napoleon had been regarded with great mistrust, people became enthusiastic for the resurrection of Italy. Russia mobilized four corps d'armée, in order, if war should occur, to prevent an Austrian triumph. Prussia declared, in a circular-letter of the 26th of April, that she would con­fine herself henceforth to the defence of the Confederate territory, and beyond this would remain neutral.

But a new turn of affairs was at hand, which once more, to a certain extent, inclined the feelings of the Regent toward Austria. While the French troops were being transported in great haste towards Italy, the people of Parma rose and drove out their Government On the 3d of May, Napoleon declared that Austria, by passing the Ticino, had broken the peace; by Austria’s fault the question had been brought to this: either Austria’s rule must extend to the Alps, or Italy must be free to the Adriatic. This, however, was entirely contrary to the ideas of the Prince Regent. With all his sympathy for the wretched condition of Italy, he was indignant at the Napoleonic insolence, which undertook of its own authority to subvert the arrangement of Europe agreed upon forty years before. He desired salutary reforms in Italy, but no overthrow of thrones, no displacement of boundaries. It was precisely the same standpoint as that from which he viewed, and wished to treat, the German situation, so similar to the Italian. However firmly he was convinced that from this situation German Unity must be educed by the sword of Prussia, he was determined to persist in the path of legitimate reform, and to respect the rights of his German brother princes so long as they did not, on their side, by hostile steps taken against Prussia, force the sword into his hands. He purposed to set the same limits to the action of the French Emperor, and to interfere energetically when they were transgressed.

In this manner he formed the plan of an armed mediation at the right moment. He at once did what every state does on the outbreak of a great war among its neighbors,—put the Prussian army in the so-called state of readiness, the preliminary of mobilization. He was by no means inclined, by a premature manifestation, as, for instance, the placing of an army of observation on the Rhine, to divert the French attack from Italy to Germany. Rather, he wished the armed mediation to take place only when the French army, whose victory over the Austrians he regarded as certain, should have advanced so far into Italy that, in the case of a declaration of war, the German army on the Rhine might enter upon the contest with a deci­sive superiority. For the time, therefore, he allowed the noise and outcry of the South German Press to pour over himself and his Government, perfectly clear about his course for his own part, though he was, indeed, somewhat feebly supported by his Ministers, since Prince Hohenzollern was not inclined to stand sufficiently firm against the pressure from South Germany, and Herr von Schleinitz and his Under-Secretary of State, Von Gruner, were somewhat beside themselves over the danger of deciding upon any active proceedings.

In the mean time the war went on, though in the beginning very slowly. General Count Gyulay, with one hundred and twelve thousand men, crossed the Ticino into the Piedmontese territory on the 29th of April; and as, up to that day, only a small French detachment had arrived in Piedmont, it was generally believed that within a short interval he would have overwhelmed the Sardinian army, which was only half as strong as his own, have entered Turin, and closed the passes of the Alps. But nothing of the sort happened. When he had occupied the nearest Piedmontese province, Lomellina, he remained inactive week after week, as if he had no other task than to await there the arrival of the French, and to greet them with a brotherly embrace.

At this time the Prince Regent decided to despatch the younger General Willisen to Vienna, not exactly to conclude any binding agreement, but for an exchange of opinion in regard to Prussia’s purposed mediation. Prussia, said Willisen, was willing to interpose for the maintenance of Austria’s authority in her Italian possessions; but, in order to give her action due weight, she must have full control over the forces of the Confederation, in which case an Austrian army might actually undertake the defence of the Upper Rhine, and a South German contingent be assigned to it. At first the Vienna statesmen took a lofty tone. They said they had expected something better than a cold mediation from their German brothers in the Confederation. It was not enough that Prussia should raise her voice for Austria’s supremacy in Lombardo-Venetia. Austria required also the maintenance of the compacts of protection which she had entered into with the Italian States; not only must Sardinia be made incapable of doing injury, but the insolent Parisian Usurper must be overthrown, and in France the legitimate King, Henry V, must be placed on the throne. Only by such measures as this could the blessing of universal peace and order be restored to Europe, and the demon of Revolution be bound firmly and permanently. They therefore allowed themselves to hope that, with Prussia’s co-operation, the entire strength of Germany would rush to arms for these legitimate and noble objects.

Willisen could answer all this only with a distinct refusal, announcing that Prussia would bind herself neither in regard to the compacts of protection, nor to the overthrow of the Sardinian Constitution, nor to a change of dynasty in France. But while these negotiations were going on, one hundred and fifty thousand French had arrived in Piedmont, by whose assistance a decidedly superior force had been able to march against Count Gyulay, and the first battle of importance, fought near Montebello, had turned out unfortunately for the Austrians. Count Rechberg, therefore, decidedly lowered his tone, declared himself ready to agree to the Prussian propositions, and suggested, accordingly, that by exchange of diplomatic communications a written compact should be framed, containing mutual obligations to the following effect: that Austria was to consent to give Prussia undivided control over the Confederate army, and Prussia to promise to begin her mediation, on the basis of the maintenance of Austria’s authority in her Italian possessions.

Such an arrangement was, however, declined by Herr Schleinitz in a despatch of June 14th, which the Prussian Ambassador was to read to Count Rechberg. The ground of the refusal was the natural one, that after the conclusion of such a formal compact, Prussia could not possibly assume the part of a mediator; as a matter of fact, the despatch really restated the original Prussian position, to the effect that Prussia would undertake an armed mediation for the maintenance of Austria’s authority in her possessions, and, according to the result of the same, would act further as her obligations as a European Power and the high position of Germany should dictate. On the same day the Prince Regent arranged the mobilization of six corps d’armée,—that is to say, a force of one hundred and eighty thousand men,—and made a proposal to the Confederate Diet for the formation of a corps of observation of sixty thousand men, to be taken from the two South German Confederate contingents. It seemed as if such a preparation might have been sufficient to prove the seriousness of Prussia’s action.

But in Vienna a different view was held. It is true that on the 4th of June Count Gyulay had lost a battle near Magenta, had then evacuated Lombardy, and had withdrawn beyond the Mincio; at the same time, the people of Tuscany, of Modena, and of Bologna, had driven out their Governments, and had furnished a considerable accession to the Sardinian army. But in spite of all this, the courage of the Austrian Cabinet was still unbroken. The soldiers had fought well; and it was hoped that, with better leadership and vigorous reenforcement, a brilliant victory would finally be obtained. The Emperor Francis Joseph hastened to Verona to take command in person. His Chief of Staff was General Hess, who had fought with honor in Italian battles. Over forty thousand fresh troops were added to the army, so that two-thirds of the entire Austrian military power were now assembled on the Mincio, and could advance against the enemy with a decided superiority in numbers.

While such hopes were entertained, considerable coldness was felt toward the German Confederate Princes, who talked a great deal about their good intentions, but were unwilling to undertake any obligation that implied active assistance; and on the 22d of June Rechberg sent a despatch to Berlin, in which he asserted that it was Prussia’s duty, as a member of the Confederation, not only to protect all Austria’s possessions, but to maintain the Austrian compacts with the Italian Governments; he also reserved a free right of action, on the part of Austria, in all the transactions of the Confederate Diet. This simply meant persistence to the fullest extent in Austria’s own demands, and rejection of the only demand of Prussia. But this arrogance was soon followed by retribution. On the 28d of June Francis Joseph led his army across the Mincio toward the French and Sardinians, and at evening reached the heights of Cavriana and Solferino.

On the morning of the 24th he was there attacked by the enemy, and an obstinate and extremely bloody contest ensued, in consequence of which, after his centre had been broken, he was forced to retire once more. Over twenty thousand dead and wounded covered the dreadful battlefield, and the two imperial generals shuddered at the sight of this incal­culable amount of misery. General Benedek, the only one of the Austrian leaders who, on the unlucky day, had fought with success, related afterwards that, in the council of war on the following morning, he had urged an immediate renewal of the battle, arguing that the French had had quite as severe losses, and had fewer fresh troops in reserve than the Austrians; but the Emperor cried out, with tears in his eyes, “Rather let us lose a province than go through such horrible things again!” The army retired beyond the Adige, to the shelter of the canon of Verona. Lombardy was surrendered.

On this very day, the critical 24th of June, the Prince Regent, unaffected by the rebuff received from Rechberg, sent a despatch to London and one to St. Petersburg, to announce the beginning of Prussia’s armed mediation on the twofold basis of a mainten­ance of the status quo as far as territory was concerned and of the introduction of political reforms in Italy, and to desire the support of the two Great Powers in carrying out this programme. At the same time, the Regent ordered the mobilization of his entire army, and made a motion in the Confederate Diet for the assembling of the two North German Confederate con­tingents. Within two weeks after this, nearly four hundred thousand men would have been on the Rhine ready for battle, a force nearly twice as great as anything France could at that moment produce in opposition. If Napoleon hesitated to abandon Lombardy, the German army, even without the Austrian contingent, had the prospect of great triumphs before it.

But just then a change took place upon the scene of war that astonished all Europe.

The two Emperors were both equally weary of the contest. Napoleon found himself before the celebrated Quadrilateral, and had to face the prospect of severe battles before he could conquer it. He dreaded serious difficulties at home from the anger of the Clerical party over a war, that now threatened even the temporal supremacy of the Pope. He perceived that his friend, the Emperor of Russia, looked very unfavorably on the revolutionary movement in Italy. Even to himself Italian national feeling appeared in a much less rosy light since his cousin, Jerome, to whom he destined the throne of Tuscany, had written to him that he had not been able to secure a single voice for his candidacy.

In the midst of all this, there came to him from London the news of Prussia’s threatened mediation, and of the first stipulation of the same: the inviola­bility of the Austrian possessions in Italy. After his agreement at Plombières, and the manifesto, “Freedom as far as the Adriatic,” this stipulation was wholly out of the question for him; yet, if he did not accept it, he ran the risk of a perilous struggle with all Germany, without the hope, which he had had in the beginning of the war, that Russia would attack his foe in the flank. Under these circumstances he suddenly adopted the resolution of escaping the mediator by making a direct agreement with his enemy. On the evening of the 6th of June he sent his adjutant, General Fleury, across to Verona, in order, to try the expedient of proposing a truce to the Emperor Francis Joseph.

The envoy found a state of mind there quite similar to that in his own camp,—an eager desire for the conclusion of the war, grave anxiety about disturbances in Hungary, decided dislike to Prussia’s mediation. The Cabinet of Vienna cared less about Prussia’s promise to save Lombardy than about her refusal to uphold the compacts of protection which insured to Austria an indirect control over Central and Southern Italy; and most horrible of all was the idea that, after Austria’s own failure in Italy, Prussia might perhaps win great victories in France, and raise herself, by that means, to the headship of Germany.

Just before this, on the 4th of July, Prussia had made a motion in the Diet that all the Confederate troops should be placed under her command; and on the 7th, appeared Austria’s countermotion, that the Prince Regent should be chosen General, according to the principles of the hallowed Confederate military organization, that is to say, with seventeen Confede­rate commissioners of inspection in his headquarters, and with the condition that all orders should be subjected to the consideration of the Diet. This meant forbidding Prussia to make war, for it was well known that the Prince would never condescend to put himself in such a position. The necessary consequence of this was a greedy acceptance of the offers of peace held out by Napoleon.

As early as July 8th a truce till the 15th of August was concluded. On the 11th of July a personal interview between the two monarchs took place at Villafranca, when Napoleon attempted to reconcile his Austrian opponent to peace by means of a story of his own invention, that with the consent of England and Russia, Prussia, as mediator, was about to make a demand that Venice should become an independent State under an Austrian Archduke, that Lombardy, Modena, and Parma should be given to Sardinia, and Tuscany to the Duke of Parma—as a matter of fact, he had himself made such propositions in London — but that he, Napoleon, was ready to grant far better con­ditions to the Emperor, whom he highly revered. He then agreed, without objection, that Venice, as well as Mantua and Peschiera, should remain Austrian, as heretofore, and that only Lombardy should be given up. He was ready to consent to the restoration of the banished Princes of Tuscany and Modena, of course on the condition that this should not be done by force of arms. Francis Joseph accepted this condition, in the optimistic belief that, if those countries were once evacuated by the foreign troops, the inhabitants would hasten to call back their beloved sovereigns with joy. The Italian States were then to receive, with the approval of Austria, a Confederate Constitution, under the presidency of the Pope; Austria was to grant liberal institutions in Venice, and the Pope was to be requested to introduce the necessary reforms in the States of the Church. In a conference of a few hours these preliminaries of peace were harmoniously discussed. Napoleon then committed them to paper with his own hand, partly at the dictation of Count Rechberg. They were to be worked out more in detail at a conference to be held as soon as possible in Zurich.

A singular peace this, by which the victor gave up all the hopes for the sake of which he had begun the contest, and by which the vanquished lost, indeed, an Italian province, but received a newly-assured supremacy over the whole of Italy. King Victor Emmanuel was most deeply wounded by this breach of the promises made at Plombières, and Cavour, at first utterly overcome, retired immediately from the Ministry. At no price would he have shared in the execution of this treaty. For an Italian Confederation, with the Pope as President, and with Austria and the two branches of her Imperial Family in Tuscany and Modena as members, would not have lightened the burden of Italy’s servitude, but would have rendered it permanent, and, above all, have extended it to Piedmont. Before this Cavour had, as we have seen, entered into the idea of an Italian Confederation controlled by Italians; but he now turned his back upon every scheme of the sort, and the more harshly Fate seemed to oppress him and his people, the more did he raise demands for an Italian nation in the future. “Since our Princes are of a foreign race and the vassals of foreign potentates, there is left only one way of salvation for Italy, consolidation into one sole and united State.”

No longer as Minister, but as leader of a party, he sent words of encouragement to the chiefs of the revolt in Parma and Modena, in Florence and Bologna, urging them to hold their position at any cost, to make the return of the former rulers impossible, to prevent any violent or communistic disorders, and to bring about a union with Sardinia by the general voice of the people. Then it was shown how much the Italians had learned in the school of life. These instructions were carried out with exemplary firmness and unanimity; and before the end of August the four provinces had determined on annexation to Piedmont, and had sent their homage to King Victor Emmanuel.

For the moment, the King was obliged to proceed cautiously. He received the announcement of the decisions of the people with thanks, and promised to recommend their wishes most earnestly to the consideration of the Great Powers. We need not describe the indignation aroused in Vienna by this action. The Pope hurled the thunders of excommunication at rebellious Bologna; but both he and Austria were afraid to take action in common in the matter. Everything now depended upon Napoleon, who saw what was going on with vexation and embarrassment, but did not know how to prevent it. He himself, at Villafranca, had prohibited any restoration by force of arms. He himself was ruling in France on the basis of the universal will of the people. How could he oppose with brutal violence that universal will as manifested in Florence and Bologna? He had allowed the floods to swell and gather together; mighty as he was, he now lacked the power to control them at his will; in spite of his frown, they burst irresistibly through the dams he had ingeniously devised. A broad foundation was laid for the future unity of Italy.

The excitement which the progress of the war had aroused in men’s minds was hardly less in Germany than in Italy; but on the north side of the Alps it produced only too insignificant, if not utterly fruitless, consequences. In the beginning of the war we saw the waves of excited feeling in the north and in the south of Germany clash harshly with one another. In Prussia Liberal sympathy for Italy had decidedly the upper hand, while in Bavaria and Würtemberg the Ultramontane party urged on the whole people to enthusiasm for the black and yellow. Many Liberal patriots, both then and afterwards, have complained that Prussia here, as in the Crimean War, threw away the opportunity of seizing, by a quick and energetic war policy, the leadership of the national enthusiasm, and of so placing herself at the head of the Fatherland. But in regard to 1859, it would first of all be necessary to answer the question, which enthusiasm the Prince Regent should have favored, the enthusiasm of the six million South Germans for Austria, or that of the twelve million Prussians for Italy. If he had chosen the former, his friend in the Confederation, Austria, would have taken excellent care that German Unity and the Prussian Headship should come to nothing; if the latter, then the work would perhaps have been accomplished, but it would have been branded with the stain of foreign aid, and France, as an ally, would doubtless have taken care to inoculate it with the virus of more than one disease. With good reason, then, did the Prince avoid both these courses alike.

The reproaches of hesitation and uncertainty which have been cast upon the Prince’s policy are likewise without justification, and spring from ignorance of the facts of the case. We have seen that his determination was fixed from the very first, and was afterwards carried out step by step firmly, and with proper adaptation to the changing course of the war.

But it is another question whether the programme of the proposed mediation was the right one, and accorded with the actual condition of affairs. The result showed the contrary. Prussia experienced what has so often happened to well-disposed mediators: the plan of mediation proposed appeared so unacceptable to both parties, that they agreed among themselves upon the exact contrary of this plan. The Prince, guided by his own feeling of justice, wished to secure to Austria the possession of Lombardo-Venetia, but to combine with this a renunciation of her hegemony in Central Italy. Instead of this, Austria gave up Lombardy, and Napoleon held out to her the continuance of that hegemony. Clearly the Prussian Cabinet had not at that time sufficient information in regard to Italian affairs to lead them to the only reasonable conclusion, that in this case no mediation whatever was possible, and every reform of the government must necessarily carry with it the overthrow as well of the Austrian as of the Papal supremacy. If they did not wish to give Austria armed assistance unconditionally, there was nothing left for them but unconditional neutrality, until, after the French occupation of Venetia, the war had died out of itself at the frontiers of the German Confederation.

Be this as it may, the Cabinet of Vienna was filled with bitter indignation against Prussia, especially after they had heard the insinuations of Napoleon. Immediately after Villafranca, Napoleon, indeed, announced to the world that he had made peace in order to avoid the threatened outbreak of a new and perilous war with Prussia and Germany; but Francis Joseph, on his side, was not deterred by this from making publicly, in direct contradiction to this declaration, the charge against Prussia that he had been driven to sacrifice Lombardy because he had been abandoned by his nearest, his natural allies in the Confederation. The Prince Regent, who had just ordered his army to advance toward the Rhine, was indignant. Between the two Cabinets there arose a violent diplomatic quar­rel. The bitter feeling grew to such a height, that a newspaper statement announcing that the two Gov­ernments were about to renew friendly relations, was emphatically contradicted on the Austrian side, both in German and French newspapers. In this way wild rumors soon began to be rife of an agreement—if not an alliance, at least an understanding—between Vienna and Paris for the humiliation of Prussia. As far as we know, this was groundless, but the state of things was serious enough.

It was natural that such a strained situation should produce a strong reaction in the public opinion of the German people. On all sides warning and threatening cries arose. Even before the conclusion of the peace, in June, assemblies in Nassau and in Frankfort had passed resolutions that Austria must be assisted, and that Prussia should receive the leadership. About the same time, in Stuttgart, the Schwäbischer Merkur brought out a declaration on the part of Würtemberg patriots, announcing that the Fatherland needed Prussia’s leadership and a German Parliament. After Villafranca, the Hanoverian deputy, Rudolf von Bennigsen, with thirty-four others, published a declaration of a similar nature, and defended it brilliantly in the Second Chamber against the attacks of the Minister, Von Borries, so that the declaration received seven hundred signatures within two weeks.

With this encouragement the same cry ran like an electric spark through North and Central Germany. Whether Prussia’s behavior up to that time was to be praised or blamed, it was undeniable that Germany’s strength without Prussia amounted to nothing; that Germany’s Confederate Constitution without an instrument of the national will must remain crippled and powerless. The citizens of Stettin transmitted to the Prince Regent a petition for a Central Government; the citizens of Gotha sent to Duke Ernest a deputation, which asked for a new Constitution for non-Austrian Germany, and the Duke, who had always been liberal and national in his tendencies, gave them a favorable answer.

On the 14th of August an assembly met in Eisenach, which resolved upon convening as large a number as possible of German patriots in Frankfort, for the formation of a German National Association, and for the renewal of the work of German Unity, which had been abandoned for the last ten years. The summons had a marked effect In Frankfort appeared Liberals of all shades, and from all parts of Germany. They all agreed about the uselessness of the Confederate Diet, and about the need of a German Parliament; but when it was proposed that a vote should be passed calling Prussia to the control of national affairs, the wrath of the South Germans, which had been gathering since the spring, burst forth so violently that finally the other party was obliged to be satisfied with proclaiming the need of a central authority, without specifying who should be invested with it. Thus the National Association, like the old Assembly in the Cathedral of St. Paul, was constituted with an express disregard of the question on which everything depended.

The Diet, which bristled up at the words, “German Unity,” like a turkey-cock at the sight of a red rag, succeeded in expelling from Frankfort the managing committee, which was to organize the activity of the Association; but a sure retreat was found for it in Coburg, under the protection of Duke Ernest, who for years had desired, and himself often urged, the formation of such an association on a national basis. The committee, for its part, labored entirely with the object of a non-Austrian Germany in view, and sought, so far as possible, to act in harmony with the Prussian Government; but, as we shall soon see, they found numerous obstacles in the way of this good intention. Nevertheless, the Cabinet of Berlin did not interfere with the Association, though the Prince Regent was of the opinion that the time was as un­favorable as possible for any agitation in the direction of Unity.

The Court of Vienna was, indeed, unwilling to cause Confederate decrees to be passed against the Association, as Herr von Beust desired, but it secretly urged the Ministries of the different states to repressive meas­ures, and with great effect. The Government of Hesse- Cassel forbade its subjects to join the Association under penalty. The King of Hanover ordered the police to keep exact lists of the members; officials of every sort who were found acting in connection with the Association were to be punished according to strict discipline; and artisans, merchants, and professional men were to be deprived of the custom of the Government officials. “The present situation,” wrote Herr von Beust, “is unexampled. In opposition to a movement which demands the overthrow of a constitution, it is usual either to alter the constitution or to combat the movement. In this case, neither one nor the other is done. The end must be a sudden collapse.” Police measures against the wicked Association were therefore adopted in Saxony, Mecklenburg, and Würtemberg, and in the south also the great majority of the population was hostile to the national party.

Once more, and in striking contrast to Italy, the . strength of individualism was shown on German soil. There was a great deal of enthusiasm, both before and afterwards, for the ideal of German Unity, but at the first step towards realization a storm of conflicting views arose. Men wished to be German, but to be Bavarian, Swabian, Saxon as well, and, above all things, neither Prussian nor Austrian. To be sure, there was between the state of things in Italy and that in Germany one essential difference. In Italy, with the exception of Sardinia, the ruling Houses were foreign, and especially in Tuscany they had grown somewhat out of touch with the country, while the States of the Church were distinguished for at once the most incapable and the most oppressive government in Europe. In such a condition of affairs, the events of every day kept the instinct for national unity and freedom alive and active, in spite of the tendency to individualism, which here, also, was certainly not without force. But in Germany, on the other hand, the Princes were all native, and belonged to the German stock; and if, in Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Nassau, the Governments repressed all independent initiative with a rough hand, yet in Sax­ony and Bavaria, in Würtemberg and Darmstadt, the mass of the citizens felt themselves well off, and the Governments, to keep them in this state of mind, were of their own accord attentive to the wishes that found expression in the Press and in the Chambers. In these countries, therefore, the people loved unity in theory, but individualism in practice.

CHAPTER III.

QUESTIONS OF REFORM IN GERMANY.

The Prince Regent soon had occasion to give expression to his ideas in regard to the question of reform in the Confederation, which had been once again so energetically revived. He still and always continued to believe in a German Empire of the future, but for the moment the announcement of any such purpose seemed to him in the highest degree dangerous. In view of the difficulties existing with Austria, of the irritated sensitiveness of the Lesser States, and of the noisy aversion manifested by the people of South Germany, he felt that to press any demand for German Unity might be sowing the seed of internal dissension, at the very time when the vagaries of the Napoleonic policy and the ambiguous attitude of Russia made mutual confidence and the firm consolidation of all Germany’s forces an absolute necessity.

What was with him the consequence of the momentary situation, in the mouths of the majority of his Ministers took almost the form of a fixed confession of faith. Count Schwerin, a leader of the former Liberal Opposition, who, a few months after the beginning of the Regency, had taken Flottwell’s place as Minister of the Interior, proclaimed in loud tones the watchword: not unity, but union. Herr von Schleinitz entered heartily into a programme so free from danger, and sent express instructions to the Prussian ambassadors at the German Courts to hold entirely aloof from all demonstrations on the part of the National Association.

When the citizens of Stettin in August sent to the Prince Regent their address in regard to the creation of a Central Government for Germany, the Minister was disposed to make, by an open refusal, the Prussian standpoint clear to them and to all who shared their views ; the outline proposed by Schwerin was, however, somewhat modified in a positive direction by the Prince Regent. The conviction that an energetic concentration of Germany’s powers, and consequently a remodelling of the Confederate Constitution, was necessary, was recognized as thoroughly justified. Only it was not wise to allow one’s self, by aspiring to the very best, to be led out of the path which was prescribed by consideration for the rights of others and by a due regard to what was at the time attainable. He said that Prussia believed that more could be accomplished, for the present, by increasing the military effectiveness of Germany and by a better enforcement of the laws than by premature efforts for a thorough reform in the Confederation.

But even this carefully-guarded criticism of the existing state of things caused great dissatisfaction among the German Courts. It was thought in Dresden, in Hanover, and in Brunswick, that when Prussia herself proclaimed the insufficiency of the Confederate Constitution, it was an express encouragement of the National Association; although she recognized the rights of the Princes for the present, she threatened the very existence of those rights for the future. The general anxiety was great. Count Rechberg struck a blow at the Duke of Coburg, that he might reach Prussia through him, and in the sharpest terms issued a formal protest against Duke Ernest’s approval of the address from Gotha, and sent it in writing to Berlin, leaving it to the Government there to take further measures. The state of things was not improved when the Prince Regent expressed perfect confidence in the loyal disposition of the Duke, who had only declared to his people of Gotha what had been agreed to by all the German Princes ten years ago,—the necessity of a reform in the Confederation; such an expression of opinion, the Prince said, afforded no ground for taking any action upon a protest.

Further than this, it was soon known that the Prussian Government was aiming at a reform of the Confederate military organization, that most sacred palladium of the independent rule of the Lesser States. The irritation of the different Courts increased; the wish was felt everywhere to come to some understanding in regard to means of defence against such wicked innovations, but in accordance with the nature of individualism, the same took place on a small scale among the Lesser States that happened in the Confederate Diet on a great one: they knew what they did not wish; but as to what they did wish, opinions differed. Baron Beust urged his sluggish colleagues to take decided measures against the National Association, but declared, at the same time, that the police would not answer the purpose; that the nation must be convinced rather by action, and that great reforms were possible even on the basis of the existing Constitution; if it was in any way practicable, he was anxious that the Prussian Cabinet should be forestalled in this matter of reform. In pushing this cause the Baron was indefatigable; he had a conference in Munich with representatives of Bavaria and Würtemberg; the Würtemberg Minister, Hügel, then had a meeting with representa­tives of Baden and Darmstadt in Heidelberg; while Beust in Vienna tried to come to an understanding with Count Rechberg in regard to harmless reforms.

But the blind King George of Hanover would have nothing whatever to do with these plans of Beust. He thought that a better constitution than that of 1815 could not possibly be invented; it was best therefore to beware of tampering with the existing state of things. His Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Platen, was, indeed, very doubtful about such an extreme attitude; but the Minister of the Interior, Herr von Borries, spoke all the more decidedly in support of his royal master, and roused a great storm in the Liberal Press, by declaring that, before the German Princes would allow any diminution of their hereditary sovereignty, they would not hesitate to accept foreign aid.

Like King George, the Elector of Hesse, after the pleasant experience of 1850, was filled with unlimited reverence for Confederate traditions, not suspecting what a dark cloud was looming up at that moment against himself on the horizon of the Confederation he was so zealously defending. In Nassau, also, where a strong bureaucratic and clerical Government was at the helm, there was a feeling in favor of rejecting all reform; but if the other states took the lead, this Government would not hold aloof.

In Baden, on the other hand, the Minister, Von Meysenbug, who was well disposed toward Austria, was not unfavorable to the plans of Herr von Beust, but the Grand Duke Frederick was firm in the opinion that a genuine reform was only attainable by the common action of the two Great Powers. He confined himself to his old proposition of a Confederate court of arbitration, the defects of which we have already seen.

So opinions and proposals were bandied about in startling confusion. But finally it appeared that the chief power on which Herr von Beust had reckoned for support, Austria, was not as yet inclined under all circumstances to come into line with the Lesser States. Against Prussia’s efforts for unity put forth in harmony with the National Association, she would naturally fight to the death. This was the more certain, since the Court of Vienna, after its Italian losses, valued all the more its position in Germany. But what Count Rechberg, in the midst of all the vexations of the past months, truly wished in the bottom of his heart was, to avoid any such conflict: he desired, not war with Prussia, but an understanding with her, and, indeed, rather with Prussia than with the Lesser States. For a generation Prince Metternich in the most intimate conjunction with the Court of Berlin had controlled the destinies of Germany: was it impossible to bring about a renewal of this satisfactory relation ?

Count Rechberg with this in view would have been ready to listen to a great many proposals, provided they did not actually affect the foundations of the Confederation. During the diplomatic quarrel after Villafranca, he had in August brought forward the suggestion that, just as in the old peaceful times, neither of the two Powers should bring forward a proposal in the Confederate Diet without previously consulting the other; and this had been favorably received by Schleinitz. When Prussia began to talk about a reform of the Confederate Constitution, Rechberg expressed to the Prussian Ambassador his perfect readiness to take steps in the matter, and only asked for a speedy communication of the Prussian proposals. It was, therefore, for the time, uncertain how far the Lesser States could count upon Austria’s co-operation in their plans.

Meanwhile, Herr von Beust had succeeded in inducing his friends to unite on a motion to be brought before the Diet. On the 17th of October it was introduced, signed by the four Kingdoms, by Darmstadt and by Nassau. Its contents were as meaningless as possible; and the spirit of opposition to Prussia that lay at the bottom was thereby rendered all the more unmistakable. Together with laudation of the fruitful capacity of development inherent in the Confederation, it was announced: that any propositions would gladly be entertained by which a repetition of the objections that had unfortunately been made of late against the execu­tion of legitimate decisions of the Confederate Diet and against its decrees could be avoided; that it was the duty of all to seek this object, and to repress agitation for the overthrow of the Confederate Constitution; and that, since of late the Confederate military organization had especially been found fault with, it was proposed that the Confederate military commission should be charged to examine the same carefully and to report upon any necessary changes. The authors of the motion avoided any reference to wishes of their own; indeed, it was no secret, that the sole aim of the whole thing was simply to get rid of Prussia’s plans of reform, and to secure the inviolability of their cherished Confederate army.

Prussia, however, readily agreed to the motion, and then laid before the Commission her own plans of reform also, which were very simple: in case the Confederation should be involved in a war in which Austria and Prussia both took part with all their forces, the two South German corps should be under Austria’s and the two North German under Prussia’s leadership; in this way a Confederate general would not have to be chosen, guided, and watched over by the Diet. It soon appeared that in spite of all the conciliatory language of Rechberg, Austria, who on the 7th of July had proposed at Frankfort the election of such a general, would not accept Prussia’s proposition; “for,” said Rechberg, “the small North German States could not, in the end, avoid submitting to Prussia’s leadership, but in the South, Bavaria would raise insuperable obstacles against any subordination to Austria.” By this the fate of the proposition was decided; though according to Frankfort usage it did, indeed, linger along several months, until the Commission in May, 1860, decided almost unanimously to recommend to the Diet its rejection.

In the mean time, another act of Prussia had caused equal annoyance among the majority of the German Courts, and had produced a more irritated state of feeling, if possible, than had prevailed hitherto.

In the unfortunate matter of the Constitution of Hesse-Cassel, the Diet had, as we have seen, desired a declaration of the Assembly of Estates in regard to some improvements of the Constitution of 1852, to which it was hoped the Government would not refuse its assent. In this affair the firmness and persistence of the Hessian people were shown in a brilliant light. The hopelessness of the situation did, indeed, exclude any attack as a matter of principle upon the validity of the Constitution that had been granted. But when it came to a question of the criticism of the same, in accordance with the decree of the Diet, Hassenpflug was able neither by persuasion and threats, nor by the offer of a new constitution, to prevent the Chambers and the electors from demanding more extended rights for the Estates. The battle lasted five years, and had no other result than the gathering of wider and wider circles of the people about their valiant representatives. Strange as it may seem, the First Chamber was unanimous in the Opposition, and the majority of the Second was also, though less determinedly than the First, persistent in clinging to its proposals, and at last even increased its demands.

As Hassenpflug prevented the two Chambers from framing a joint resolution of the Assembly of Estates, the proposals of the Chambers finally reached the Diet separately, each containing a statement that their propositions of amendment taken together formed an indivisible whole. They were accompanied by a series of propositions of amendment coming from the Govern­ment, which were aimed at rendering even such efforts of a moderate opposition for the future impossible. These documents then remained for nearly two years in the hands of the Diet committee on Hessian affairs, until finally, in 1859, the efforts of the Court of Cassel roused the chairman, Baron Marschall of Baden, out of his lethargy.

With perfect coolness the Diet continued its method, which had been in practice since 1851, of remoulding individual constitutions at its own omnipotent pleasure, in utter disregard of the Vienna Final Act. Times had certainly changed somewhat since 1852, and therefore the committee, while doing everything possible to be agreeable to the Elector, for the honor of the monarchical principle, nevertheless thought it best to show some consideration for the loyal Estates, inasmuch as such lively sympathy for these prevailed among the German people and in almost all the German Chambers. They therefore rejected those propositions of the Government which tended to increased repression, and then refused to grant some of the desires of the Estates, but gave their assent to the remainder, and proposed to hold out to the Elector, if he acted according to these, the hope of the guaranty which he desired. In this way, the committee thought, the dreadful cancer which for years had been eating away the German body politic, would be cut away with a gentle hand.

But this attractive prospect was unexpectedly disturbed.

After the committee had made its report to the Diet on the 28th of August, and after the Diet had determined that the vote on the subject should be taken on the 20th of October, Herr von Usedom sent an urgent request to the Prussian Cabinet, that any decision in this matter might be delayed until the reception of a memorial in which he hoped to throw light on Prussia’s position in regard to the Hessian question. Usedom did not always show great insight as a diplomatist; but this time, moved by his feelings as well as by his under­standing, he succeeded in hitting the nail on the head. Casting a glance backward at the past history of the affair, he pointed out the series of illegal assumptions on which not only the electoral Government, but also the Diet, unfortunately with Prussia’s co-operation, had based its action in the overthrow of the Constitution, thereby rendering the results obtained utterly void from a legal point of view. He said that the last chance was now at hand for Prussia, with the approval of the whole nation, to separate herself from such illegal action, and to restrict the Diet once more to the limits of its legal authority. He pronounced it to have been a suicidal policy that led the Prussian Ministry, in 1852, to recognize the Diet as competent to interfere, with constitutive power, in matters of internal law and privilege in the individual States, and so perhaps sometime to abrogate the Prussian Constitution also. According to him, the sole legitimate office of the Diet in this matter of Hesse would have been to have carefully pointed out and expunged in the Constitution of 1831 the articles that were contrary to the principles of the Confederation, but beyond this, in accordance with Article LVI of the Vienna Final Act, it was bound to refrain from any interference in constitutional questions in Hesse-Cassel. The Diet, he continued, had had a consciousness of this duty, and had, therefore, not abolished the Constitution, but had simply ordered it to go “out of effect.” This was the vulnerable point; and as an understanding between the Elector and the Estates in regard to the work of 1852 had been shown to be out of the question, Usedom recommended that a motion should be made for putting an end to the suspension of the Constitution of 1831 and for limiting the interference of the Diet to the expunging of certain articles contrary to the principles of the Confederation.

In the whole exposition every word was accurate, with the single exception of the assertion that the decree of the Diet of 1852 had been aimed at only a temporary suspension. The potentates who settled the matter at that time had had by no means such tender consciences, and Usedom did not think so himself. His distinction had no other object than to facilitate for the wrongdoers their return to a legal method of proceeding.

When Herr Schleinitz read this memorial, which flew in the face of all the traditions of the Diet, he was a little frightened. He sought from Herr von Gruner some light on the question as to how far Prussia was bound by the action of Uhden and Manteuffel in the matter. Schleinitz himself admitted that the report of the committee could not possibly be accepted; but he thought that a restoration of the Constitution of 1831 could never be passed through the Diet. “If we take the part of the people decidedly in this affair,” he said, “the whole Diet will brand us as fostering a tendency to Revolution.” It will be readily understood that, after these indications of the Minister’s feeling, Gruner’s opinion was given distinctly against Usedom. And it may here be added, that, in the further course of things, the Prussian Ambassadors, Herr von Sydow in Cassel, Herr von Savigny in Dresden, and Herr von Werther in Vienna, took also this same view, and thereby made the task of their Government by no means an easier one.

For the purpose of further consultation, Schleinitz took a journey to Baden-Baden, where the Prince Regent with Auerswald was then staying, and Usedom was immediately summoned thither. The latter brought further evidence for a full consideration of the past mistakes, and produced on the 7th of October an outline of the motion as he would put it to vote in the Diet.

The Regent made a careful investigation of everything; Auerswald immediately expressed himself in favor of Usedom’s views; even Schleinitz gradually dropped one difficulty after another out of sight; and the Regent finally gave his decision in accordance with his words of November 8th: “ The world must know that Prussia is everywhere ready to defend the right.” Usedom’s motion was approved; a detailed memorial of the whole matter, drawn up entirely from Usedom’s point of view, was prepared; and after a full Ministerial Council had, on the 10th of October, at the Regent’s command, considered the matter and given a unanimous assent, the memorial was sent on the same day to Vienna with a request for Austria’s support. It was added, at the same time, that Prussia was firm in her determination in regard to the question of what was lawful in the matter, and would act on that determina­tion, even if Austria refused to join her.

This turn in the policy of Prussia was soon generally known, and aroused on all sides a violent agitation, highly characteristic in its different forms. In Hesse-Cassel the effect was like the awakening from a troubled and anxious dream. Crushed by superior force, with­out hope of support, the Estates had contented themselves with suggesting at least some concessions, without which, as Usedom said, their existence would remain a mockery; and even against these their oppressor had raised a protest Then came the news of Prussia’s action, bearing, as they hoped, a true message of approaching salvation. In a moment the effort after small concessions vanished; and once more arose among the people the demand for their rights, for the ancient and thrice-confirmed rights of their country. The Second Chamber by an almost unanimous vote abandoned their late propositions of amendment, which had been rejected by the Elector, and adopted an address to be presented to him, as well as a memorial to be sent to the Diet, desiring the restoration of the lawful Constitution of 1831. The enthusiastic appeal went abroad among the people throughout the whole of that small country; officials, citizens, and peasants were indefatigable in the presentation of patriotic resolutions; and with impotent wrath the Elector looked on at the irresistible progress of this agitation, which aimed at nothing but what was just.

The excitement extended far beyond the Hessian boundaries. In all German lands the Liberal party roused itself for the good cause; in assemblies, in the meetings of associations, in the newspapers, the cry was re-echoed for the recognition of those rights which had been so long and so harshly trampled upon; with fierce passion the treatment of Hesse by the Diet was represented as a shame and disgrace to the German nation; and there could be no doubt that after this, the Chambers of the German States would, almost without exception, raise their voice for the acceptance of Prussia’s motion and against the Majority in the Diet.

All this increased the dissatisfaction which was aroused among the German Courts by Prussia’s action. Their vexation at seeing her likely to acquire popularity in South Germany was intensified by the consciousness that, in the year 1850, for the sake of opposing the Prussian Union, they had espoused a thoroughly rotten cause, and had been soiling their hands with it more and more every year. None of the Sovereigns or Ministers had any respect for the Elector or for Hassenpflug: they clinched their fists in their pockets at the thought that, for the sake of such friends, they were now obliged to choose between joining Prussia in casting aside their own work as unlawful and worthless, or drawing the wrath of the whole German people upon themselves and the Diet and furnishing the National Association with priceless material on which to base its atrocious demand for a German Parliament. And they were so anxious to remain popular in those bad times, when by the Italian war Austria’s power had been shaken, Prussia’s influence increased, and the blood of the whole nation set on fire!

Negotiations were, therefore, begun with Prussia. Count Rechberg expressed regret that Prussia, in spite of the agreement of August, had irrevocably adopted an opinion, without previous communication with Vienna; and he further pointed out that the Constitution of 1852, now so harshly judged by the Prussian Cabinet, had been mainly the creation of Prussians ; in any case, by the decrees of the Diet, passed at that time, a firm legal connection had been established between the Confederation and the Elector, which the Diet ought not to assail. But it was not necessary to abandon entirely the course which had been adopted. It was only by Prussia’s sudden turn that the people of Hesse-Cassel had been aroused from the calm into which they had subsided. Nothing further would be necessary than that the Diet should charge the committee to frame its report somewhat more favorably to the Estates, and to introduce into the new Constitution aa amendments, such articles of the Constitution of 1831 as were essentially unobjectionable. In the opinion of the Count, it was impossible to pursue the opposite course, and restore as a whole the Constitution of 1831, which had been abolished by the Diet, and then to agree upon and expunge the unsuitable articles one by one.

In this connection, a memorial of October 26th, written by Rechberg’s chief adviser in all German matters, Herr von Biegeleben, rose to the unctuous tone of the palmiest days of Metternich. “If it is once recognized,” said this document, “that the old Constitution was incompatible with the rights of the Confederation, no well-disposed person will find fault, if the occasion is seized for a complete revision, in order that with the authority of the Confederation, with the free cooperation of the country, and with the good-will of all concerned, a work may be accomplished, which will be safe from all attack in the future, and will be worthy of the Hessian Government and of its subjects: that is the true intention of the Decree passed by the Diet in 1852; for this object we are ready to agree that the subject shall be again given in charge to the committee, in order that the work may there be still further perfected.”

It was not difficult for Herr von Schleinitz, in refuting these specious phrases, to justify Prussia’s standpoint. At the same time he agreed to a postponement of the final vote and to a further consideration by the committee, to the great annoyance of Usedom, who revenged himself by publishing secretly—in disregard of the strict prohibition of Schleinitz—the memorial of the 10th of October, thus causing a fresh outburst of public opinion. The complicated negotiations between the German Courts, which were now carried on for months, need not be related in detail. The renewed consideration of the matter by the committee of the Diet at length produced its result in the shape of a report of the 19th of January, 1860. It was recom­mended in this report, that on points concerning which the Hessian Government and the Estates were agreed, their decision should give validity to the corresponding articles of the Constitution of 1852; that, where no agreement had been arrived at, the text of 1852 should be valid, but with the exception that any provision of 1831, not contrary to the principles of the Confederation and recommended by the Estates, should be adopted.

On the other hand, the changes proposed by the Hessian Government were declared inadmissible.

This was meant as a proposal of mediation; it appeared to its authors to be a great concession, when they granted that, in spite of the Decree of 1852, there were in the Constitution of 1831, which had been con­demned at that time, provisions not contrary to the principles of the Confederation. But none the less on this account was the recommendation of the committee an act of constitutive power, such as the Diet was incapable of by the fundamental principles of its existence. Since the last declaration on the part of the Hessian Chambers, there had been no longer any propo­sitions of the Estates at all before the committee; the verdict of the committee that this declaration had no force was utterly without legal justification; hence, the committee had altered an article here, and approved one there, solely according to its own subjective opinion, as if the whole world recognized it as a function of the Diet to say what should be lawful and what not in any country’s internal affairs.

Naturally, Prussia continued in her opposition. On the other hand, the King of Hanover was very indig­nant with the committee which had yielded to the Liberal current in sixteen articles. The Elector was also angry at the rejection of his amendments; he had had great hopes of being strong enough, after they were carried, to secure the succession to one of his sons. But both Sovereigns soon perceived that nothing better than what the committee recommended could be had, and reconciled themselves to giving their unqualified assent.

On the 24th of March, 1860, the Diet passed a decree in accordance with the recommendation of the com­mittee. With Prussia voted only the Saxon Duchies, Oldenburg, Waldeck, Reuss (younger line), and the free Cities. Prussia brought forward a protest against the decree, on the ground that the Diet was exceeding its proper functions, and proclaimed it legally worthless and not binding. Pfordten, passionate as ever, declared that by such a step Prussia aimed a death-blow at the dignity of the Diet, and he proposed that a special committee should be appointed for the censure of the Prussian vote. But Austria, Hanover, and Baden objected to this; and the matter ended in a simple declaration on the part of the president, which an­nounced it to be the constitutional duty of all the Governments to recognize the decree. In private con­versation, the Ministers Schrenck in Munich and Von Hügel in Stuttgart, as well as the King of Saxony, admitted that in 1852 things had been carried too far; but they thought that the decree, having been once passed, ought to be respected.

When, in April, the Prussian Lower House, after an exciting discussion, called upon the Governments to remain firm in the defence of the Hessian national rights, the Württemberger Staatsanzeiger replied with a violent polemic against the whole Prussian policy. In Cassel, however, the Government, in accordance with the decree of the Diet, made a new concoction, taking the Constitution of 1852 as a basis, accepting a number of the former proposals of the Chambers, and adding a homoeopathic dose of privileges for the Estates. The constitutional document so created they made public on the 30th of May, 1860. The next question was, what effect they would thus produce on the country.

While in this way a violent contest had arisen in regard to the fundamental principles of the Confederation, a new turn of general European politics called forth still another demonstration of German unanimity of feeling.

The Emperor Napoleon, placed in a dilemma between the demands of Austria, the Pope, and the Clerical party on one side, and the efforts of the Italian national party which had been half recognized by him at Plombières on the other, had first made an agreement with Austria to call a congress of the five Great Powers for the settlement of the affairs of Italy. But then he found that neither Austria nor the Pope made any arrangements whatever for carrying out the internal reforms agreed upon at Villafranca, and consequently that he also need be no longer bound by that compact. On the other hand, if he again entered into friendly relations with Sardinia, he could once more have the hope of acquiring Savoy and Nice according to the arrangement made at Plombières, to which there had naturally been no reference since Villafranca.

Towards the end of 1850 he had come to a decision. In the beginning of January, 1860, appeared an unofficial treatise, entitled, The Pope and the Congress, in which it was argued, that the temporal sovereignty of the Pope in the Papal States was neither needful nor advantageous, to his spiritual authority, but on the contrary injurious. A significant change of Ministers followed: in the place of the Conservative Walewski, Thouvenel, whose Italian sympathies were well known, was appointed.

In Turin, also, Cavour seized again the reins of government, and the popular agitation for the unity of Italy swelled in a stronger tide in all parts of the country. In Florence and Bologna, the Sardinian Constitution and the Sardinian mode of election were introduced; from Rome and from the Marches many petitions were sent to Paris for liberation from the intolerable government of the Pope; in Naples the popular excitement rose to such a pitch that the English Ambassador declared there was no other course possible than a change of the system of government or a change of dynasty.

Napoleon then announced to King Victor Emmanuel, by a despatch of February 24th, that if he would content himself with the annexation of Parma and Modena, and would, at the same time, govern the Romagna as Papal Vicar, France would aid him against any foreign attack; but if he was inclined to go further, he must do it at his own risk, and France would then renew her claim upon Savoy and Nice. Victor Emmanuel chose the latter alternative; and in March took place, on the basis of a formal vote of the people, the annexation of Tuscany and of the Emilia (as the united territory of Modena, Parma, and the Romagna was now called) to the Sardinian Crown, and at the same time the incorporation of Savoy and Nice into the French Empire.

There was no longer any talk about the great con­gress. Napoleon had, however, on his part, after separating himself from Vienna and Rome, sought connections elsewhere, and had partially succeeded in finding them. The Whig Ministry in England took a warm interest in the struggles of Italy, and rejoiced heartily at the overthrow of the scheme devised at Villafranca. More than this, Napoleon had for some time had in mind for France a change from the system of the exclusion of imports and of protective tariffs hitherto in vogue to principles of moderate free-trade; and he found England very ready to make advances in this direction. He therefore, on the 20th of January, 1860, brought about the signing of a commercial treaty, the consequences of which, as we shall soon see, acquired great importance for the development of the affairs of our own Germany. Thus far the understanding between England and France was perfect.

In Russia, also, although the sympathy with France was not so warm as in the spring of 1859, the Emperor Alexander and Prince Gortschakoff were still of the opinion that a triple alliance between Russia, Prussia, and France would be a real league of peace for Europe, then so unsettled, and would at the same time, such was the Russian idea, be also an excellent support for Russia’s position in the East, where she was opposed to Austria and England. Napoleon took good care not to discourage any suggestions of this kind; on the contrary, he made repeated attempts, in the direction of Russia’s wishes, to cultivate similar tendencies in the mind of the Prussian Regent. He sent to Berlin friendly hints, that France would greet with joy the elevation of Prussia to a fitting position in the German Confederation, and that, if Prussia would then agree to a little adjustment of frontiers on the Rhine, France would insure her a rich compensation, perhaps the acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein.

The Prince Regent allowed all these advances to fall flat to the ground; and when, at the end of March, the annexation of Savoy and Nice ensued, with an official declaration, that France had in this region recovered her natural boundaries, a sharp rent was made through the whole web of diplomacy. Before the war, Napoleon had proclaimed the lofty unselfishness of France: and now came the acquisition of a noble province, while at the same time a very evident desire was shown for the further restoration of the so-called natural boundaries,— that is to say, for the conquest of the left bank of the Rhine.

Switzerland and Germany saw themselves alike threatened; and the general excitement manifested itself more and more, when even in England the Government and the newspapers expressed their mistrust of the dangerous policy and the vagaries of the French Emperor. Napoleon in vain proclaimed in the most solemn manner his love of peace; all that he could obtain was a statement on Lord Palmerston’s part that England would not indeed declare war on account of the annexation of Savoy, but that she should persist in her disapproval of that action. The Prussian Regent, who at this time made a journey through the region about the Saar, took occasion, at a festival of welcome there given him, to announce, to Napoleon’s great vexation, that never, with his consent, should the Fatherland lose a clod of German soil.

After this, when, in the very beginning of May, Garibaldi, with a company of a thousand volunteers, put to sea from the port of Genoa, and it was known in a few days that he had landed in Sicily, in order to bring that island also under the rule of Victor Emman­uel, the whole world was convinced that he would never have ventured on such an undertaking without the co-operation of Cavour, and that Cavour never would have given his co-operation without the approval of Napoleon. The Russian Cabinet, especially, which had always had a fancy for posing as the peculiar protector of Naples, expressed its great dissatisfaction in Turin as well as in Paris. Napoleon protested that he was not in the least responsible for this bad business; but he found little belief for his assertion, although this time he spoke the truth, and had himself been thoroughly taken in by Cavour. The latter had helped on Garibaldi’s undertaking in every way, had secretly gained over a number of Neapolitan generals to the Italian cause, and finally had despatched a Sardinian squadron to protect the expedition on its voyage. But at the same time he had constantly given the French Ambassador the most explicit assurances, that he had no suspicion of Garibaldi’s plans and actions, so that the landing in Sicily was as much of a surprise to Napoleon as to the rest of the world.

But what difference did it make? He had become the object of universal suspicion: judging by the variations of his policy, which with all its variations was always aggressive, every one credited him, and not without reason, with plans of disturbance in all corners of Europe; at this time no one was inclined to have anything to do with him.

Under these circumstances he once more turned his glance toward Prussia. The calm, open, and firm attitude of the Prince Regent during the preceding years had inspired the Emperor, not with hatred, but with respect: he sent to Berlin a proposal for a personal interview. The Regent had a feeling that Napoleon was anxious to set him at odds with Germany* and to bring the exchange of the Rhine Province for Schleswig-Holstein again under discussion; he therefore twice refused the proposal, and finally accepted it only on the express understanding that the basis of all discussion should be the inviolability of German territory. King Max of Bavaria had already expressed his intention of visiting the Prince at Baden-Baden while the latter was making his summer residence there as usual; the King of Würtemberg also wished to come; and thither the Regent invited the French Emperor, at the same time sending a circular-letter to the German Courts to make them acquainted with the proposed interview.

This caused a nervous anxiety everywhere; but the most disturbed of all was the King of Hanover, who had been already troubled and annoyed by the prospect of King Max’s visit to Baden. King George had long been suspicious of the Prince Regent with his Liberal Ministers and his plans of reform in the Confederation; and he regarded the Napoleonic Empire as simply Satan himself made flesh. From a union of these two nothing but mischief, annexation, and the abolition of all sovereignty, could possibly proceed. After long deliberation, he decided to take the bull by the horns, travelled all night to Berlin, and saw the Regent early in the morning of June 13th. “You must not go at all,” he cried, “or you must invite all the German Princes, and the Emperor of Austria as well, to the interview.” The Regent, somewhat astonished at his zeal, let the mention of the Emperor of Austria rest where it was, but at once invited the royal visitor himself, and then wrote also, with the same object, to King John of Saxony. “I could not invite any one, or exclude any one,” he said afterwards, “but I did not wish it to seem as if I were doing something behind the back of Germany.”

We must give a somewhat detailed account of this interview, not because the results there obtained were very important, but because the whole course of affairs was so characteristic of the Prince Regent, who had no thought of using the friendly disposition of France as a means of exerting diplomatic pressure upon the German opponents of his plans for national unity, but with perfect openness took the position of representa­tive of all the German States in his dealings with Napoleon.

On the 14th of June the Regent arrived in Baden, where King Max had already been for some days; the three other Kings, and a number of lesser Princes, the Grand Duke of Baden as host, the Grand Dukes of Darmstadt and Weimar, and the Dukes of Nassau and Coburg, were likewise there. The Regent declared to them his determination to consent to no rearrangement of boundaries at the expense of Germany or of German States. The four Kings agreed among themselves to show the Prince royal honors and to grant him precedence.

On the 15th of June, therefore, at seven o’clock in the evening, he received the imperial guest at the head of a troop of royalties. After eight he made his visit to the Emperor; their conversation, the only one that they had alone, lasted about an hour, but hardly consisted of anything more than Napoleon’s complaints of the groundless excitement against him that prevailed in Germany and of the hostile attitude of almost the entire German Press. It was true, he said, that there was a party in France desirous of acquiring German territory. But his own view was quite different. He desired that the two peoples which stood at the head of civilization might keep up a friendly intercourse and join their interests together. He had come for the purpose of announcing these sentiments.

The Regent thereupon expressed his satisfaction and approval: he said that he had agreed to the meeting the more willingly, as he felt that it would be a pledge of peace. At the same time he observed that the excitement in Germany was the consequence of the incorporation of Savoy, after the solemn proclamation of French disinterestedness. “ That was an exceptional case,” cried Napoleon, “the fulfilment of a compact made some time before, according to which, if Sardinia obtained certain advantages, France was’ to receive compensation for assistance rendered. In the case of Germany the state of things is very different.” “I did not myself have any knowledge of that compact,” answered the Prince; “and the impression produced by the annexation was the greater, since your Majesty proved yourself in the war a successful general.” “Now,” said Napoleon, “what is to be done to allay all this excitement?” “Tell the German Princes what you have told me,” replied the Prince.

The next morning the Emperor took advantage of the visits to and from the Princes to act on this advice. “ Have what you say published in all the French newspapers,” said the King of Würtemberg to him. The Emperor called on the King of Hanover also, but was informed that the King was not at home; he was, indeed, not in the house, but he was in the garden behind it. To the King of Saxony, the Emperor expressed a wish for a commercial treaty, on which subject the King referred him to Prussia. After this, there were church-goings, drives, and a banquet, as usual on such occasions; in the evening there was a great assembly; the Austrian Ambassador, Count Trautmannsdorff, who was present, reported that the Emperor’s manner during the whole evening was very quiet and self-contained, that he was almost silent; he carried on long conversations with no one, and most of the German Princes showed an embarrassed reserve with regard to him. The people also treated him with great coolness; they cried out to a company of French who were shouting “Vive l’Empereur” to be silent, and then themselves shouted for the Prince Regent.

On the 17th, the Emperor had another conversation with the Prince Regent and King Max in regard to Naples; the King afterwards reported that Napoleon’s statements were not calculated to produce confidence; the latter said that in the affairs of Italy he was obliged to keep the possibility of a conflict with England constantly before his eyes; nor would it do for him to oppose the King of Sardinia, who was urged on by the popular party and had not the power to resist.

One extraordinary conquest the Emperor did make before his departure. He entered unannounced the reception-room of the King of Hanover, and waited there very quietly till the appearance of the blind monarch, who was at first disturbed at the intrusion of a stranger; afterwards, however, he received the Order of the Legion of Honor with gracious thanks, and was so fascinated by the well-calculated speeches of Napoleon, that from that time he sang the Emperor’s praises in every key. At nine o’clock Napoleon departed, with his eyes unpleasantly opened by the events of his expedition and by its empty results.

But an after-piece to conclude the great Assembly of Princes was further intended for the Prince Regent. He had, although at the risk of Napoleon’s hostility, stood forth so emphatically as the representative of harmony in Germany, that a sharp lesson on the nature of that harmony could not have been unexpected by him.

On the afternoon of June 17th (at the instigation, if I am not mistaken, of the King of Hanover) a conference of the Princes who favored an entire Germany met at the residence of King Max of Bavaria. The Grand Duke of Baden was no longer included among these Princes; the Assembly therefore consisted of the four Kings, of the Grand Duke of ’Darmstadt, and of the Duke of Nassau ; and its object was to consider the questions at issue between these Princes and Prussia. The first subject of discussion was the unpleasant business of Hesse-Cassel: Saxony and Hanover desired that the matter should be settled at once and finally by the Confederation’s authorizing the new Constitution of May 30th. But Bavaria and Würtemberg advised prudence; Würtemberg hesitated in regard to the constitutionality of such a course, and Bavaria was opposed to it out of consideration for public opinion. Therefore, no decision was, adopted; and the attention of the Princes was turned to a still more important question, the reform of the Confederate Constitution desired by Prussia.

All were unanimous that, after the opinion of the committee as expressed by Pfordten, the Prussian proposition was to be rejected. But when they came to consider the matter, they found that, even on this subject, their views were very different. King John of Saxony proposed that they should expressly recognize the essential point of the committee’s report, which was that special agreements should be reserved for the case of Prussia’s or Austria’s taking part with their whole army in a war undertaken by the Confed­eration, and that they should then entreat the Prince Regent either to withdraw his proposition, or at any rate not to enter a fresh protest against the Diet’s decree. But King George of Hanover opposed this energetically. He said that that would practically be realizing Prussia’s plan; if it was not possible to induce the two Great Powers to provide each three corps to serve under the chosen Confederate general, according to the provisions of the Constitution, then the best plan, in his opinion, would be to form three armies, those of the two Powers, together with another which should include the remaining Confederate forces, and the commander of which should be chosen by the Governments concerned, and guided and controlled according to the principles laid down by the Confederate Constitution. On this subject also a unanimous agreement proved to be out of the question; and the

Assembly was finally obliged to be satisfied with deputing King Max of Bavaria to deal as decidedly as possible with the Prince Regent in the name of the German Princes, both on this subject and in regard to the suppression of the National Association.

But King George could not rest satisfied. Immediately after the discussion, he dictated for his friends a memorial in regard to the military organization, to the effect that, according to the distinct statement of the Prince Regent, in case of a war, the Confederate military organization in its existing form would be exploded; that, however, would be an event fraught with the greatest consequences politically, for the dualism thereby introduced would tear in pieces the unity of Germany, and would, moreover, lay the axe at the root of the sovereignty of the individual Princes. One of the first elements of that sovereignty was military supremacy; and the loss of this would be the beginning of the end, and would render the Princes vassals of the Great Powers. Such an anomalous situation could not endure permanently: the sover­eignty of the Princes must either prevail in its integrity and traditional sacredness, or it must in a short time entirely disappear.

The proud Guelph who fought with such zeal for the inviolability of his historical right did not know that his noble forefathers a century before had never pos­sessed more than a limited and derived sovereignty, or, more exactly, that the idea of underived sovereignty in general is a creation of only very recent times.

Meanwhile, after the departure of the other Princes—at which time the King of Würtemberg took occasion to address the Prince Regent once more with a great deal of bluster in regard to the Tariff-Union—the good King Max, on the 19th of June, tried his fortune with the Prussian ruler. He first made an effort to recommend the compromise of the triple division of the army: the Prussian plan, he said, could not be accepted by the German Princes, since it deprived them of the control of their own troops; Prussia had better, therefore, withdraw her plan. But the Prince answered very decidedly that this could not be; both plans must come before the Confederation for its decision. Unity was certainly preferable in itself; but considering the size of the army and the extent of the territory to be defended, a twofold arrangement was the natural one to be adopted. A triple division would simply mean the proclamation of anarchy; the interference of the various commissioners who would be present at head­quarters would hamper all the movements of the Confederate army. “The twofold arrangement,” said the King, “would mean dividing Germany along the line of the Main.” “It would be only a temporary measure adopted during the continuance of war,” replied the Prince.

An equally meagre result attended the King’s attempt to bring about energetic action against the National Association. The Prince, for what regarded his own position in German affairs, referred to his answer to the address of the citizens of Stettin; but he refused to take any steps against the Association, so long as its proceedings were not subject to legal prosecution; everything of the sort that had been done in Saxony, Hanover, and elsewhere, had called forth universal disapproval. This the King could not deny.

He then turned with all the more feeling to a personal desire, the one which had in the beginning brought him to Baden, the desire to bring about more intimate relations with Austria. The Prince expressed his entire readiness for this, with the simple condition that Austria should at length cease to regard Prussia as an upstart and recognize her fairly as an equal Great Power. The very way in which modem Prussia had, in 1815, been formed out of two isolated portions of territory, had been the result of an effort made even then to keep her as weak as possible: when Prussia, in spite of this, succeeded in raising herself, the insinuation had been spread abroad from Vienna, that Prussia was seeking to incorporate into her own Kingdom the two states which lay between her provinces, and an experience of forty years had not been able to extinguish the suspicion thus caused. “I must wait and see,” said the Prince, “whether my latest utterances have altered this disposition on the part of Austria, but no one can blame me if I feel myself injured: Austria has the settlement of the question in her own hands; so soon as she ceases to wish to injure Prussia, an arrangement can easily be brought about.” King Max, on this, expressed the opinion that Prussia’s attitude during the last war had injured her much; every one had thought that she held back purposely, in order that Austria might be overcome. “When was your army ready to march on that occasion?” asked the Prince. “In July,” the King answered, “just when your summons came.” “Prince Frederick of Würtemberg told me exactly the same thing,” continued the Regent: “ then what would have happened, if I had wished to march as early as April? No, we delayed in order that we might not draw the French main army upon German soil in the beginning of the contest; but Austria gave up a province at Villafranca rather than let us have the glory of a triumph over France.”

In spite of the irritated feeling shown in these words, the King proposed that the Prince should have a personal interview with the Emperor Francis Joseph, for which he himself would gladly make the necessary arrangements. No objection was made to this. The Prince only required that, after the manifesto of the preceding year, which had put such a slight upon Prussia, the first advances should come from Vienna. He added, that, true to his principle, he would have nothing to do with premature guaranties or alliances, but that he would discuss certain possibilities, which, in case of war, might render it necessary for Austria and Prussia to act together and in common with Germany.

King Max, therefore, went to work eagerly to urge the Court of Vienna in the direction of reconciliation, and found all the more favorable a reception, since Austria had a little while before tested the feeling in St. Petersburg with regard to a renewal of the Holy Alliance, and had been referred to Prussia on the subject by Prince Gortschakoff. The Prince Regent also did what he could by writing a letter to the Emperor Francis Joseph, in which he described the proceedings in Baden-Baden, and deduced from them the advantage of an understanding between Austria and Prussia in matters of general European policy.

On the 10th of July the Emperor replied, and proposed an interview in Dresden. Meanwhile it had become known that the Kings of the Lesser States were very anxious to be present in Dresden, as they had been in Baden, at the meeting of the two great Sovereigns; but the Prince Regent thought that this would not improve matters, and proposed to the Emperor that they two should have a conference alone at Teplitz. This proposition was immediately accepted. Rechberg and Schleinitz were to accompany their sovereigns.

On the 20th of July, at Mainz, the Prince considered the line to be taken in the discussion. It was clearly recognized, that, after what had happened in Baden, a Franco-Prussian alliance would be out of the question for a long time to come; and that the result of this was, that the circle of diplomatic means useful in obtaining concessions from Austria had been considerably narrowed. Yet Prussia, if she supported Austria in Italy, must certainly claim proportionate advantages in return: the removal of what was unsuitable in the Confederation, an alternating presidency of the Diet, and a settlement of the Holstein matter in accordance with Prussia’s wishes. On other conditions the Parliament would never grant money for a war on behalf of Austria. Besides this, the Prince Regent had long had a feeling, that an alliance with Austria could have little value, unless that country were strengthened internally, and that such a strengthening presupposed liberal reforms and religious tolerance.

On this basis he made his propositions to the Emperor on the 26th of July. They were to the effect that Prussia would be ready to take part in the common defence against a common danger; that is, in the defence against a French attack upon the possessions of either state, unless Austria should have provoked the war. Francis Joseph, on this, declared that he had no wish ever to provoke a war, and that in case he were at any time forced to become the aggressor, he would do it only after an understanding with Prussia. The Prince further proposed common resistance to any manifestation of French greed for annexation, whether in Switzerland, Belgium, or Holland. Germany would regard any act of aggression on the part of Sardinia as a casus belli, if German territory should be violated by such act.

Thus far everything went harmoniously. But when the Prince introduced the subject of what Austria was to concede in return, the harmony was considerably disturbed. The Emperor rejected the alternating presidency of the Diet; he could not permit an ancient and honorable privilege of his House to be infringed. Progressive movement in parliamentary legislation, as well as equal recognition of different creeds, he regarded as affairs of domestic concern, concerning which he could enter into no written compact, though he expressed by word of mouth his purpose of advancing in the path suggested. The Prince then brought up the subject of the discussion of the Confederate military organization which was pending at Frankfort, but only obtained the Emperor’s consent that a conference of generals from either side should consider the question of the twofold or threefold division of the army. Finally, in regard to Schleswig-Holstein no decision whatever was Reached. After all this, there could be no question of the signing of any compact.

None the less did the Emperor return well satisfied from Teplitz. Although he had received no binding promise of Prussian assistance in case of a French attack, yet he had now no doubt that the Prussian Regent, following his own disposition, would not look idly on in such an event. “I am sure,” he said to the King of Saxony immediately afterwards, “that I shall not be left in the lurch a second time.”

In the mean time, in the field of European politics the clouds had been growing steadily darker and more ominous. Wherever Garibaldi appeared, the Neapolitan forces scattered almost without fighting: they either fled or deserted to the enemy. On the 7th of September he entered Naples, the capital, in triumph, amid the joyful shouts of the people; and he now proclaimed his intention of first freeing Rome and afterwards Venetia, and only then of bringing united Italy to do homage to Victor Emmanuel. This would have meant an attack on the French garrison in Rome, and if such an attack contrary to all expectation succeeded, a war of revolutionary Italy against Austria.

Cavour could never permit such madness. There was only one way: Sardinia must herself advance in the name of Italy, must occupy the eastern portion of the Papal territory between the Emilia and Naples, must push on from there to Naples, and, gently putting Garibaldi aside, proclaim on the spot Victor Emmanuel as ruler over both Sicilies. That was the only way to secure the unity of Italy and at the same time to close for her the era of revolution. This course was adopted, and in a short time the work was finished. With the exception of Rome and Venetia, the peninsula belonged to the King of Italy; and Cavour announced on every occasion, that the Government kept the fate of Venice carefully in view, but could not for the time, in consid­eration of the feeling of Europe, think of making war upon Austria.

This assurance was everywhere received with real or pretended suspicion. The English Government, indeed, declared itself wholly pleased with Cavour’s successes; but the continental Cabinets joined with one voice in declaiming against triumphs so revolutionary, and acts of aggression so contrary to the law of nations; and a hundred times it was asserted in the leading diplomatic circles, that it would be impossible for Cavour to restrain his followers from an attack on Venetia. In case such an attack should take place, who could foresee the consequences ? Napoleon, who was a good deal disturbed by the outcry of the Clerical party over the new losses of the Pope, once more recurred to the idea of a congress of the Great Powers, the decisions of which would remove from his shoulders all responsi­bility for the fate of Italy. Russia was ready to please him on this point, in the hope of receiving in return some assistance in the affairs of the East.

Besides this, the Czar Alexander had been greatly incensed at Garibaldi’s action, and was very anxious to confer personally with the Prince Regent in regard to the state of things; it was, therefore, decided that in October the two Sovereigns should pass some days together in Warsaw. The same thought occasioned the Emperor Francis Joseph likewise to ask of his own accord whether a visit from him would be agreeable to the Czar.

The meeting of the three Sovereigns, which took place on the days from the 22d to the 26th of October, had a good result, in that the personal bitterness exist­ing between the two Emperors was for the time lessened, but positive decisions were not arrived at here any more than between the Prince Regent and Francis Joseph. The proposition of Napoleon in regard to a congress for the settlement of Italian affairs, which was brought forward by the Emperor Alexander, was regarded by Prussia as not definite enough for practical action, and was simply rejected by Austria without comment. Besides this, the Emperor Alexander, who, after Cavour’s proceedings, had withdrawn his embassy from a Court so eager for revolution as that of Turin, did not conceal his vexation that Prussia did not follow his example, but contented herself with sending to Turin a severe criticism of the unlawful policy there pursued. Things remained, therefore, in a state of uncertainty, and no common plan of action was adopted.

For the Prince Regent there also began at this time a serious crisis in his own country.

CHAPTER IV.

CONTEST OVER THE MILITARY REFORMS IN PRUSSIA.

The enthusiastic joy and exaggerated expectations with which the majority of the Prussian people had received the new Government made the sober reality seem all the colder and harder when it was seen that the grossest abuses of the former system, the arbitrary action of the police, the false interpretation of the laws, the harsh management in ecclesiastical matters, did, indeed, disappear, but that in other respects everything went on in the old rut, and a paradisiacal condition of unheard-of freedom and happiness did not by any means begin.

Definite desires for particular objects also arose in a short time, the non-fulfilment of which caused bitter complaints. There was a great deal of vexation because the new Minister of the Interior, Count Schwerin declared that it was more in accordance with liberal ideas to leave heads-of-departments of “feudal” tendencies in their places, so long as they did nothing illegal, than to fill all influential positions with partisans of his own, as Herr von Westphalen had done.

When the Upper House decidedly rejected two liberal laws, concerning the establishment of civil marriage and the adjustment of taxes upon land, laws which had been proposed by the Government and accepted with enthusiasm by the Lower House, the public grew very angry because the Government did not proceed immediately to a reform of the Upper House, to a thorough clearing out of that nest of the feudalists. People did not wish to doubt the Liberal disposition of the Minis­ters, but it had been hoped that the champions of the former Liberal Opposition would now, in an official position, lay the axe at the root of the Reaction with a firmer hand.

Then came the Italian war. The people, as we have seen, had not the slightest desire to take up arms for Austria; at the same time, here also, there was no confidence in the restless son of the Napoleons; and the Parliament, that the country might be prepared for war, agreed without opposition to a loan of forty million thalers, and to an increase of twenty-five per cent in the most important taxes. When, however, the great mobilization followed, only to end in a general disbandment after Villafranca, when Austria and France rivalled each other in throwing all the responsibility of the misfortunes that had happened upon Prussia, the people came decidedly to the conclusion, that things were going not very differently from the way they went in 1850, that Herr von Bonin did not seem to have much more martial ardor than Herr von Stockhausen, nor Herr von Schleinitz much more energy than Herr von Manteuffel. And when the National Association had called the question of German Unity once more into life, the public dissatisfaction was completed by Schwerin’s answer to the address of the citizens of Stettin, an answer which, it was thought, contained nothing but involved and self-contradictory statements. “The Ministers are excellent men,” it was everywhere said, “but they are not equal to the management of great questions; they lack strength and determination, if they have not indeed actually abandoned their old opinions. The people must keep their eyes open.”

Such was the state of things when the Prince Regent undertook the work, which he had long recognized as the indispensable condition of any progress in German affairs, the remodelling of the Prussian army. It was very clear to him, that any serious attempt to support the demands that had been sacrificed at Olmütz—Confederate reform and the assurance of constitutional rights in Hesse-Cassel and in Holstein—would be attended for Prussia with great danger of war, and that the existing army was insufficient for the accomplishment of the great object

It is well known that the Prussian military organization was grounded at that time upon the laws of 1814 and 1815, which, on the basis of a universal obligation to serve, assigned all the male population for three years to the regiments of the line, and for two years more to the war-reserve of these regiments, and then for seven years to the first, and for seven years more to the second, levy of the militia. In time of war the regiments of the line and the first levy of the militia would constitute the active army in the field, while the second levy would garrison the fortresses. Now, in 1815, the population was something over ten millions, and the number of those yearly drafted 40,000; the number and the strength of the regiments of the line were therefore established upon the basis of three such yearly drafts. In forty years, however, the population had increased to nearly eighteen millions, and thus the number of those under obligation to serve had increased to 65,000, while the regiments could still, as before, only receive, train, and pass over to the militia the original 40,000, in consequence of which 25,000 young men every year escaped service entirely. Evidently there was no truth in talking about a universal obligation to serve under such conditions; on the contrary, injustice and unfairness abounded in every quarter. As has been mentioned before, the first levy of the militia, consisting of men of from twenty-five to thirty-two years of age, who had already served, belonged to the active army destined for the field; now, in the mobilizations of 1849, 1850, and 1859, it had been shown that half of these men were married and fathers of families, so that their death would ruin whole households, and yet they were exposed to the fire of the enemy, while many thousands of unmarried youths were sitting quietly by their own hearths.

But this was not all. Between the officers of the line and those of the militia called out only for war there was a very great difference. The former were soldiers by profession, who had grown up in the service, and were constantly with their troops; the latter had for the most part had their training in a one-year’s term of service, and under ordinary circumstances fol­lowed their calling as citizens, not becoming acquainted with their men before the mobilization. Moreover, they themselves, as well as their men, were unaccustomed, at least at first, to strict discipline and accuracy of tactics; in spite of energy and courage, the harmony and quick­ness of action in their battalions was not equal to that in those of the line. It was not enough to place 50,000 fathers of families in the first rank of battle; they were placed there and made to face the enemy with an organ­ization inferior to that of the younger men.

In the Baden campaign of 1849 the Prince Regent had himself had ocular evidence of the inferior skill in manoeuvres and of the proportionately greater losses among the militia; and even at that time he had deter­mined that a fundamental change must be made in this direction.

After long consideration of many systems, the Prince had at last fixed on a plan which by its very simplicity proved its general applicability. The “universal obligation to serve,” which had shrunk into a mere figment, was to be made once more almost a reality, and the yearly draft to be increased from 40,000 to 63,000 men. In order that it might absorb these accessions, the line required an increase of thirty-nine infantry and ten cavalry regiments. On the other hand, the first levy of the militia was divided; the men of from twenty-five to twenty-seven years, the majority of whom were still unmarried, were added to the war-reserve of the line-regiments, while the remainder were removed from the active army and assigned with the second levy to the garrisoning of the fortresses. By these arrangements all the difficulties were got rid of, the fathers of families were protected, the young men uniformly brought to the front, and the active army everywhere provided with reliable officers.

The Regent seized the occasion of the mobilization of 1859 for applying this system. When the demobiliza­tion came, he kept all the divisions of the militia under arms, each being represented only by a part of its men: from these the new regiments of the line were to be formed. The Minister of War, General von Bonin, took hold of the plan with great zeal, and prepared the necessary outlines of laws and schedules of expenses for the next Parliament. The new regiments of the line could naturally not be kept up without money; the additional cost of the proposed active army, though not much larger than the former one, was estimated at nine and a half million thalers yearly.

Today there is heard but one general sentiment of gratitude for the work of King William, without which the founding of the German Empire would have been a shadowy dream. But at that time it was otherwise. Public opinion was embittered by the humiliation which the Government of Frederick William IV had suffered in foreign affairs, and by the harsh pressure of the system of the feudal party; the people had likewise become dissatisfied with the new Ministry, from whose weakness they could not expect great actions either at home or abroad. What was the use of creating forty-nine new regiments for such a Government, when they would be used only for brilliant parades and to provide pay for young nobles as their lieutenants, whose principal business it would be to annoy good citizens by their haughtiness and insolence ? And to this end it was proposed to abolish the militia, the grand result of the War of Liberation, the peculiar representative of the people in the army ! And for such objects as these, in addition to the already crushing burden of the taxes, nine millions were demanded for the army of the line, the expense of which, as it was, had made it impossible for the Government to support, as it should, the productive branches of industry.

This was the cry from all parts of the country: it was certain that warm debates would arise in the next session of the Parliament. General von Bonin did not feel himself adapted to a parliamentary contest, and exchanged his ministerial chair for the command of the army on the Rhine.

He was succeeded by General Albrecht von Roon, a man of conspicuous talent, of thorough education, of passionate energy, and of soaring ambition. Although he had shortly before proposed a plan of reform of his own, widely different from the official one, he now placed himself unreservedly at the orders of his highest military superior, and declared himself ready to cany out the reform in the army according to the Regent’s commands, and to defend it in the Parliament. Among the Liberals, however, this change of ministers awoke mistrust of the Government. Bonin was considered liberal, while Roon was regarded as an absolutist. It was thought that the time for showing consideration was over, and that it would be doing the liberal elements of the Ministry a service, to prove to them that they had a strong support in the popular will.

Under such conditions the Parliament was opened on the 12th of January. The Regent’s speech from the throne mentioned Prussia’s efforts for Confederate reform, and in behalf of Hesse-Cassel and Holstein, and then went on to announce the reform of the army. “The experience of the last ten or twenty years,” said the Regent, “has shown the readiness of the people to make sacrifices and their capacity for fighting, but it has also shown that a bad condition of things has taken a deep hold in the army; and to get rid of this is my duty and my right. It is not intended to break with the traditions of a great time; the Prussian army will remain for the future also the Prussian people in arms. But I ask that you will give an unprejudiced examination and your approval to a plan which has been most carefully matured, and which consults alike the common interests of the citizen and of the soldier. This will, in all quarters, give proof of the confidence of the country in the honesty of my intentions. No measure of such importance for the defence and protection, for the greatness and power, of the Fatherland has yet been brought before the representative assembly.”

These were simple and on that account doubly impressive words. They could leave no doubt that the Regent saw in this the burning question of his policy, that he made every other consideration dependent on this, and that he would regard every one as friend or foe according as they supported or opposed this measure. “ If the Liberals are wise now,” said the former Prime Minister, Von Manteuffel, “they are sure of the possession of power for many years.” It was, however, destined that this wisdom should belong, not to the Liberals, but to their opponents.

On the 10th of February, 1860, the Government brought up in the Lower House drafts of two laws,—one in regard to the arrangement of the obligation to serve, and the other in regard to the appropriation of nine millions and a half of thalers. The committee to whom these were referred, chose Georg von Vincke as their president, and the retired major-general Stavenhagen to present their report.

Stavenhagen had at that time a great reputation among the Liberals in military matters; he was an upright and honorable man, free from the bitterness of feeling so common among officers who have been retired. But even he did not escape the prevailing current. He did, indeed, entirely approve of the increase of the draft to 63,000 men, and he had no objection to augmenting the number of regiments of the line. But he declared that the removal of the militia from the active army was a slight to the former, and an abandoning of the most sacred traditions of the Prussian people. More than this, he felt that a period of two years’ service for the training of the infantry was quite sufficient for purposes of war; if such an arrangement were introduced, then, as compared with the results of the three-years’ system, either one-third of the expense would be saved, or the number of disciplined soldiers would be increased by one-third.

In vain did the Ministers protest against both these proposals. They showed that, with a two-years’ term of service, half of every battalion would consist of raw recruits, and the other half would not be strong enough, when the reserves were called out, to form a firm framework for the whole. It was argued, moreover, that only a prolonged continuance in the service could give a body of troops the internal stability which was essential for solid and consistent action in the field.

The experience, which in the wars soon after was to give a striking confirmation of these statements, had not yet been acquired; and in reply to them, it was asked whether the recruits and militia of 1813 had required a three-years’ term of service to win their glorious victories. The two proposals of Stavenhagen, that the militia should be retained in the active army, and that a two-years’ term should be adopted for the infantry, were agreed to by the committee; there was no doubt that they would be accepted in the House also, and the plan of the Ministry consequently rejected.

These proceedings occasioned the Government to take a serious step, the first step on a path that led from a contest over the army to a contest over the Constitution.

It was decided, that, if some subordinate advantages were renounced, a new law in regard to the obligation to serve was not necessary. The law of 1814 imposed the universal liability to be called on for defence, and the obligation to serve for three years. It was further specified in that law that the strength of the army (which necessarily meant the yearly number of recruits) should be determined in accordance with the conditions then existing in the country: that in 1814 the power of determining this was the prerogative of the King alone, went without saying; and hitherto no one bad ever suggested that the Constitution of 1850 affected this prerogative. A natural deduction from this was a like power on the King’s part to arrange the divisions in which the recruits, when levied, should receive their military training; and on this point also there had hitherto been no difference of opinion. To be sure, the Government’s plan of assigning the three youngest yearly accessions of the militia to the war-reserve of the line hardly seemed in harmony with the law of 1814. But even in that law the sharp distinction between the line and the militia was of importance only in time of peace: in war, the needs of the time alone were to decide about the arrangement of the troops; now, the war-reserve took up arms only in case of war, and in case of war it was allowable, even by the old law, to assign to that reserve the soldiers of the militia.

On the whole, then, the Government felt itself authorized, on the ground of the old law, to carry out its reforms without regard to the opposition of the Parliament. It therefore withdrew its draft, which had been so severely assailed. Meantime, however, it needed money to carry out its new arrangements, and for that purpose it required a decree of the Parliament. Herr von Patow therefore brought forward in the House a motion to grant the Government nine millions for the next fourteen months, for the object of “ carrying on and completing the measures which are neces­sary to make the army more prepared for war, and to increase its effectiveness, and which are practicable on the basis of laws already in force.”

This led to a discussion attended with unpleasant results. Patow assured the committee that the definite settlement of all questions was not at all prejudiced by his proposition; the only object was a provisional arrangement; if the House should later refuse the necessary funds, everything could be reduced again. Afterwards, during the discussion in the House itself, he limited the meaning of his words, saying he had designated the existing state of things as provisional only in so far as a definite arrangement could not be arrived at until after a further consideration by the Parliament, that is, on the occasion of the settlement of the expenses in the budget.

But the majority in the House and, as was soon seen, in the country, preferred to stand by the first statement to the committee, that the measures intended were only temporary, and, if objected to by the Parliament, would be withdrawn and the old state of things restored. After Vincke, then, had once more with great zeal dwelt upon the two years’ term and the maintenance of the militia as indispensable, the nine millions for the current year were almost unanimously granted. The Upper House followed this example; but, in marked contrast to the other Chamber, it added a unanimous resolution, urging the Government to hold fast to the original plan of reform, and to carry out all the measures appertaining to it.

The Prince Regent, when he closed the session on May 23d, 1860, complained of the opposition to the bill concerning the army; the delay produced by that opposition, he said, might have been very serious, if the Parliament had not granted the supplies for the necessary increase in the means of defending the Fatherland; in this action he saw a pledge that the necessity of the military reforms would in the end be rightly appreciated, and the question that had been postponed, in a short time satisfactorily settled.

These words admit no other interpretation than that the Regent saw in the granting of supplies a virtual assent to the military reforms, and expected from the next session a definitive approval of the expenses. He therefore followed the letter of the proposition, which had been accepted, in which the Government had demanded the money, not only in order to put the army in a temporary state of preparation for war, but in order to increase its effectiveness, that is, to adopt the new organization. The Opposition, however, clung uncompromisingly to Patow’s first statement, according to which every part of the new and provisional organization might be made of none effect by their opposition in the following year. This difference between the two points of view, or, if any one prefers, this ambiguity in the term “provisional arrangement,” was the source of all the ensuing trouble. For the more convinced each side was of the justness of its own opinion, the more inclined it was to doubt the good faith of the other and to presuppose in it a systematic plan of deception. Such a feeling was sufficient to destroy all chance of a harmonious agreement.

In July, 1860, after the new formations were com­pleted, the Prince Regent ordered the division of the same into groups of regiments, and the final appointment of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers. In October, their colors and standards were delivered to the regiments, and in January, 1861, the solemn consecration of these military insignia took place. From this time on every one could say to himself that these were no longer provisional, but permanent formations, which the Regent would never decide to disband of his own accord. The newly formed army was then an accomplished fact.

When the country found itself undeceived, the feel­ing of bitterness was very deep. Patow had said that everything was to be provisional, that everything could be retracted if the Parliament refused its sanction. Now came the question, whether the thousands of officers had provisional commissions, whether the one hundred and seventeen battalions would vanish on the simple rejection of one item in the budget. “The Government,” said the moderate Liberals, “should have declared its purpose plainly before the money was granted.” “That is a simple remark!” cried the more violent. “Will you never see that everything was craftily arranged that you might be deceived ? ”

So the irritation and anger sank deeper and deeper; and although just at that time the Liberal Bernuth became Minister of Justice in place of the more conservative Simons, the general dissatisfaction with the Ministry increased to such a degree that at two by­elections in the autumn the very electors who in 1858 had rejected every Democrat of 1848, now sent to the Lower House two chiefs of that party, Waldeck and Schultz-Delitzsch.

While the outlook in domestic policy was so dark, a change of sovereigns took place in Prussia. On the 2d of January, 1861, death ended the melancholy existence of Frederick William IV, and King William I began to govern in his own name, an event which, under other circumstances, would undoubtedly have increased the disposition to gratify the royal wishes, but which, in the midst of the general irritation, produced this effect in only a very slight degree. In his speech from the throne at the opening of the Parliament, on the 14th of January, the King alluded to the reform of the army as something already accomplished; he trusted that the Parliament would not shun the task of supporting and furthering the arrangements which had been made. At the same time the Upper House was urged to give its assent to the reform in the marriage laws and to the adjustment of the land-tax, without which the military reforms could not be financially assured. This hint, that an unfavorable vote about the land-tax would endanger the reform of the army, had an immediate effect; the two laws which had hitherto been rejected by the Upper House were now passed by a large majority, and a harmonious relation between that body and the Throne was once more established.

Unfortunately no such satisfactory result appeared in the Lower House.

Even in the discussions over the reply to the Address from the Throne, decided differences of opinion between the Ministry and the former Ministerial party had come to light in regard to foreign and to German policy. In spite of the energetic opposition of Herr von Schleinitz, the House accepted a motion of Vincke’s, to the effect that Prussia had no interest in opposing the consolida­tion of Italy, as well as a motion of its committee, expressing thanks to the King for his efforts for a reform in the Confederate military organization, but at the same time submitting its opinion that this was not sufficient for the national needs, which required a total reform of the Confederate Constitution with a recogni­tion of the position which properly belonged to Prussia.

Schleinitz, well knowing that the King would not decide upon any such step as this, until the reform of the army was placed on a solid basis, declared that this motion went far beyond the actual standpoint of the Government; but he gained nothing except an increased opposition in the House to the military reforms. “For,” said the Liberals, “there is no reason for granting over 100,000 soldiers and an addition to the budget of many millions to a Ministry that has neither courage nor energy to take a decisive step in the great national cause. Let Herr von Schleinitz continue writing despatches; he will never go any further, and there is no need of money or soldiers for that.”

As for what concerned the military reforms themselves, the Government, faithful to its original position, had brought forward no bill in regard to the obligation to serve, but had referred to the remodelling of the army only in connection with the statement of the bud­get, increased now not by nine and a half, but only by eight millions. Herren von Patow and von Roon did all in their power to justify the carrying out of the reforms on the basis of existing laws. But the suspicion of deliberate deception could not be eradicated. Patow had said that everything was provisional, everything revocable : now it was announced that everything was definitively settled and could not be changed.

A group of some fifty members, led by Waldeck, was disposed to strike out the entire cost of the new establishment, and then to wait and see what the Government would propose. But the majority were not inclined to go so far. They had no objections to make against keeping up the new regiments, but they wished to force the Ministry to propose a law in regard to the obligation to serve, and they wished to see the militia retained in the active army.

In order to secure this, it was necessary to prove that the old law was violated by the new arrangement, for the legalization of which a new law would be necessary; and it must be confessed, it was no very striking argument that was brought into the field in support of this view. It was alleged that the assignment to the war-reserve of the line of several of the yearly acces­sions to the militia, which by the new system became a permanent arrangement, was by the old law only allowable for the time after the actual outbreak of a war, but not for the mobilization before the war. To make it apply to this latter, therefore, a new law was required.

In accordance with this theory, the framers of the old law had intended first to bring the battalions before the enemy on a peace footing, and then to send the reserves after them when the war had fairly begun. As such a position was too absurd to be maintained, refuge was taken in the distinction, that, beside the mobilization for actual war, there was a mobilization for diplomatic purposes, such as had taken place in 1850 and in 1859; to include the militia in this was declared to be by the old law wholly inadmissible. But this explanation was no better founded than the original argument. In both of the instances adduced, there had actually been a question of serious danger of war; and in any case, every mobilization, even if there is perhaps hope that the enemy will give way without a battle, is a threat of war, the consequences of which no one can determine beforehand.

However, in such a state of passion as prevailed, this interpretation of the law seemed to the majority quite sufficient to support the assertion that the definitive recognition of the military reforms was impossible, unless a new law were brought forward in regard to the obligation to serve. The estimates of the new establishment, therefore, after being reduced by seven hundred and fifty thousand thalers, were once more approved for the current year; but the sum was transferred from the ordinary to the extraordinary expenses; that is, into the class of payments occurring once and not regularly fixed; and a resolution of Vincke’s was appended to the accepted budget, in which, after the above-mentioned arguments had been adduced, the proposition of an army law, that should alter the provisions of the law of 1814, was mentioned as an indispensable condition of the permanent support of the new military arrangements.

Yet once more had an open breach been, not exactly avoided, but postponed. The parliamentary term was coming to an end ; a general election was at hand; it was left to the Prussian people themselves to express their opinion of the work of the King.

CHAPTER V.

CONFLICTS IN ALL DIRECTIONS.

The Government did not yet abandon the hope of a favorable issue in the ensuing session. Step by step, in the preceding year, had they drawn nearer to the accomplishment of their object; they felt that, after the first surprise had worn off, the country and the parliament would not longer fail to recognize the advantages of the military reforms. They clung all the more strongly to this view, as the firm establishment of the new army was rendered more desirable by the daily increasing confusion in German affairs, where, in many directions, the possibility of an appeal to arms came daily nearer.

Two different and wholly contrary signs of the times were now showing themselves side by side, in a thoroughly German fashion : an eager desire on the part of both Princes and people for Confederate reform in general, and an utter unlikelihood that any understanding would be arrived at in regard to the particular plans of reform under consideration. In opposition to Prussia’s proposal concerning the Confederate military organization, the four Kingdoms, with Darmstadt and Nassau, had, in August, 1860, at a conference in Wurz­burg, brought forward a proposition, that the unity of the Confederate army should be maintained, but that, in case Austria and Prussia placed their whole force at the orders of the Confederation, the appointment of the general should be left to the two Great Powers. At their conference at Teplitz the two Monarchs decided, as we have seen, to leave the question to a council of generals from both sides, who should meet at Berlin.

The sessions of this council lasted till April, 1861: whatever concerned technical military details was readily settled; but when political considerations came under discussion, everything ended without the real object having been attained. It came out clearly, that Austria was far from disposed to recognize the fundamental position of the Prussian proposal, the placing of Prussia on an equal basis with herself; on the contrary, she had it in mind, after she had once re­established her own internal affairs on a firm basis by means of a strongly centralized government, to allow in Germany only a federation in which she should be the leading Power: with this end in view, she would be well satisfied with a German triad, since, under such an arrangement, the Lesser States would be ready to keep Prussia’s ambition within narrow limits.

In regard to another not less important question, the defence of the northern and eastern coasts, opinions were quite as sharply divided. Prussia desired for this purpose a single organization, as well for the protection of the coasts as for a flotilla of gunboats under her command; Hanover, on the other hand, advocated for the non-Prussian portion of the coast a separate organization under the command of Hanover. The part of Prussia was taken by those most nearly concerned, to whom the protection of the coast was a serious matter, that is, by Oldenburg and by the Hanse Towns; but Austria and the Lesser States favored Hanover, for they cared much less about the defence of the coasts of the North Sea than they did about preventing any increase in the power of Prussia. The result of endless negotiation was, that no decision was arrived at, and the coast of the North Sea was left as defenceless as the Upper Rhine.

On the other hand, Prussia’s protest was entered against every decree of the Diet tending to extend its authority over matters that had been left by the Act of Confederation (such as affairs of general utility) to voluntary agreement among the states ; and in regard to which, therefore, the Diet could only take action with the unanimous consent of all its members. The Lesser States had now united, with the purpose of increasing the popularity of the Diet by pursuing just this course; and they brought forward one proposal after another, all directed toward the most laudable objects: a bill to establish a Confederate commission to arrange uniform weights and measures for all Germany, a bill aimed against piratical reprints, another to bring about the development of a German process of law for civil and for criminal prosecutions. All these Prussia opposed for the well-known reasons, and by her opposi­tion rendered it impossible to pass them.

Little trace of these discussions, however, came to light at the time. But the feelings of the German people were quite enough irritated by the continuance of the trouble caused by the two great burning questions, that of Holstein and that of Hesse-Cassel.

Neither the Confederate decree, nor the Constitution of 1860 that had been founded upon it, had sufficed to settle the difficulties in Hesse-Cassel. The leader of the Hessian Opposition, the barrister Friedrich Otker, a man of unyielding character and of courage equal to his tenacity, of thorough knowledge in legal matters, and at the same time possessing as a party-leader a prudence never to be led astray, gradually gathered together all sections of the country and all classes of the people about the banner of the one legal Constitution, that of 1831. When the Estates were to be chosen according to the Constitution of 1860, all the electors voted and all the candidates accepted, with reservations in favor of the ancient right. Hassenpflug had done away with the oath taken by the representatives to support the Constitution; this exactly suited the champions of the ancient right: the Second Chamber unanimously constituted itself and then voted that, since it had not been summoned in accordance with the laws of 1831 and 1849, it was incapable of performing the functions of the Estates of the land. It was immediately dissolved.

A new election, some months later, produced the same result, while a motion on the part of the Government of Baden was introduced in the Diet, to the effect that, in view of the evident impossibility of carrying out the decree of the Diet, the Elector should be empowered to return to the old Constitution. The Elector was irritated to the highest degree, dissolved the Parliament once more after a three days’ session, and presented to the Diet a memorial, savage beyond all measure, protesting against the proposition of Baden. At the same time, his enthusiastic and muddled Minister, Abée, kept proclaiming that the Elector was the sole embodiment of legitimacy in those wretched times, and prophesying, a seer in spite of himself, that with the fall of the Elector the whole Confederate Constitution in Germany would go to pieces.

Of Schleswig-Holstein we shall speak later. On the 7th of February the Diet threatened once more to chastise the Duchies, upon which England and Russia both made urgent representations in Vienna, Berlin, and Frankfort, entreating that such a measure might be abandoned, as likely to endanger seriously the peace of Europe.

These were the things that increased the popular excitement in all corners of Germany. Thundering appeals of the National Association, energetic resolutions of the Chambers in Dresden, Carlsruhe, Bruns­wick, tumultuous assemblies of citizens in Suabia and Franconia — all re-echoed the cry, that their rights should be restored to Hesse and to Holstein; and all came to the decision, that, for the growth and prosperity of German rights and German power, the creation of a German Central Authority and of a German Parliament was required. Zealous patriots, like the Duke of Coburg, bestirred themselves in all directions to extend the idea of unity from the educated classes to the mass of the people: at a festival of the Gotha Shooting Guild a German Shooting Association was founded at the instigation of the Duke; soon there were German athletic associations and German singers’ associations, and at every German shooting-match and singing festival the greatness of the united Fatherland was glorified. Then followed German conventions of deputies, of cities, of merchants, and of lawyers; and through all the gatherings of the different industries there was woven like a red thread the cry for German Unity, which was always responded to by the applause of throngs of spectators.

The same fashion prevailed everywhere, the same enthusiasm, the same unanimity. Only, if this was not to be disturbed, one point must not be touched upon, and that the decisive one—if any thought was entertained of transferring all these dreams from the realm of ideas into that of reality,—the question, who was to be the future holder of the German central authority ? On this there was a division, as there had been ten years before, between the wishes of the advocates of an entire and those of a restricted Germany, of the Clericals and of the Liberals, of the South Germans and of the North Germans. For this reason there was a tacit agreement at the great meetings and festivals to avoid so far as possible the delicate question, and, instead of touching upon that, to stir the feelings of the assembled throngs by brilliant portrayals of the splendor of the German State and of the happiness that would attend the accomplishment of German unity. Those who spoke thus had no suspicion into whose hands they were playing. The aspirations thus aroused could not be satisfied by any programme founded on reality, whether it aimed at an entire or a restricted Germany ; the warmer this enthusiasm was, the more difficult did it render any practical effort for reform, and thus, as was soon seen, it was only doing service in the cause of individualism.

The result of all this, so far as the King of Prussia was concerned, was the impression in his mind that the attitude of reserve hitherto adopted by him on the great question could no longer be maintained, and that he should be obliged to take a definite stand in the matter. After the close of the session of the Parliament he went, as usual, to Baden, where the attempt at assassination, made on the 14th of July by a half-crazy student, had no other effect than to increase his calm confidence in God. He had, at that time, a long interview with Herr von Bismarck, who was at Baden resting for a time from his labors, and whose first and last word to the King was the urgent recommendation of a bold policy. From Baden King William went to the sea-baths at Ostend, accompanied by Minister von Schleinitz and the Ambassador at London, Count Bernstorff. Thither came also the Grand Duke of Baden, with his new Minister, Baron von Roggenbach, a young man of a fertile mind, of attractive manners, and of vigorous activity, who, following the preponderating opinion in his own country, openly declared his adhesion to the plan of a strong central authority, that should have the King of Prussia at its head and be responsible through its ministers to a parliament chosen by popular election. In other words, he favored a constitution similar, in the main, to the outline of the League of the Three Kingdoms of May 26th, 1849, and similar to that in this point also, that the entrance into the more restricted union that was to be formed independent of Austria was left optional to each individual Government. Roggenbach declared himself ready to bring forward this plan, either in the form of a circular to the Courts or of a motion in the Diet, if he were assured of the approval of Prussia.

Herr von Schleinitz had many misgivings. Above all things, it was clear to him that there must be no mention of Prussia’s taking the lead in such a matter. Then it was difficult to see how such a twofold apparatus of Government—Ministers of the Empire responsible to the general Parliament, and Prussian Ministers responsible to the Prussian Parliament—could work without disagreement and friction; and Prussia could not possibly subordinate herself unconditionally without some guaranty of her independence, to the control of a German Parliament. Before any definite opinion was expressed about the plan, all these points must be thoroughly examined.

Count Bernstorff agreed with the above criticism in many particulars, but showed himself more favorably disposed to the main idea than Schleinitz had been.

The King himself spoke even more approvingly, and it was finally agreed that Roggenbach should shortly bring to Berlin a more detailed development of his system for a final decision.

Meanwhile the King, having returned to Berlin, busied himself with the preparations for his solemn coronation, which was to take the place of the usual paying of homage, and was to be performed at Konigsberg on the 18th of October. He intended to express the great importance which he attached to Prussia’s entrance upon her constitutional existence, by this renewal of a ceremony which had been used at the time when the electoral hat was changed into the Prussian kingly crown, and which had not been repeated since. With this solemnity before him, he became confirmed in his resolution to give his foreign policy a more decided tone than it had had hitherto.

After he had returned Napoleon’s visit at Compiègne in the beginning of October, and had once more exchanged assurances of peace and friendship with the Emperor, he appointed Count Bernstorff Minister in place of Schleinitz, and then set out on his journey to Konigsberg, in order, with all the pomp of the Church, to place the regal crown upon his head. He went through this solemn act in profound agitation of spirit, regarding it as a promise of the faithful fulfilment of duty made in the sight of God the Lord Mindful of this, ho said at that time to the members of the Parliament and the Estates present at the ceremony: “Since the crown comes from God only, I have announced, by my coronation in the holy place, that I have received it in humility from his hands.” This consecration made the prerogatives of that crown seem to him all the more sacred, though to his serious and upright mind they transformed themselves immediately into stern obligations. To fulfil the obligations and to guard the prerogatives was his determination devoutly and piously formed. In the pursuit of that end he cared not on what side strife and opposition awaited him.

Complications in all directions were not wanting.

With Austria, indeed, at that moment a better rela­tion seemed about to be formed on the basis of common action. The negotiations in regard to the Elbe Duchies had hitherto been carried on only in the Diet, and had consequently been confined to Holstein. In August, 1861, Denmark attempted to make an arrangement directly with the two German Great Powers, upon which both the Powers, in complete accord, on the basis of the Compacts of 1852, brought up also the com­plaints of Schleswig. Denmark then refused to allow that the two Courts had any right to interfere in such a way in the internal affairs of the Danish State; so that the chance of war and perhaps even of conflicts with foreign Powers came daily nearer. In this connection, evidently the most important thing was to induce Austria to consent to common action as long as possible.

For this reason the satisfaction in Berlin was all the greater, when, in the autumn of 1861, Count Rechberg began to incline to the Prussian view in the affairs of Hesse-Cassel also. In 1850, as we have seen, he had been for a time Confederate Commissioner in that country, and had there become thoroughly familiar with the Elector and his counsels. He now saw Prussia’s position exalted by recent events far and wide throughout Germany; he had the general sympathy for the maltreated Hessian people before his eyes; Austria herself had been, since the 26th of February, 1861, a constitutional state, and Rechberg had had to endure harsh language in the Imperial Council on account of his former behavior in Hesse. In short, he be­came convinced that in this matter the Diet held an untenable position, and he announced to the Prussian ambassador his readiness to yield. It is unnecessary to say how gladly this news was received in Berlin.

Unfortunately this was but a momentary gleam of sunlight, which was soon obscured by clouds darker than ever and doubly pregnant with storm. In the Saxon Chamber a proposition had been brought forward for a German central authority and popular representation. Herr von Beust, convinced, as we know, of the necessity of the Governments’ doing something for reform, resolved not to hesitate longer, and drew up a plan for a German Constitution, which he hoped would be received with approbation by all parties because he had allotted a morsel of reform to each. It was his old idea: the Diet was to be replaced by conferences of Ministers of all the German states, to be convened for four weeks twice in every year for a speedy settlement of business, once in the south at Ratisbon under Austria’s presidency, and once in the north under Prussia’s. Besides this, he recommended an assembly of delegates from the Parliaments of the different states, to be sum­moned, so soon as the Diet should deem it necessary, for the consideration of whatever bills should be presented to it; and finally, a Confederate Court of Appeal to decide disputes that might arise in connection with the Constitution.

In September he made a journey to Vienna to have a confidential interview with Rechberg. The latter, who, since his failures in 1859, had been impressed with the necessity of winning popular sympathy everywhere, received him in a friendly way. It is true he was, for the moment, deprived of the advice of his firm and well-informed counsellor in German matters, Herr von Biegeleben, who was seriously ill; but nevertheless he readily entered upon the consideration of Beust’s plan, stifled some doubts about the delegations, and induced Herr von Beust to introduce, for the interim between the two yearly conferences, a Confederate executive body, and even a Directory of three, Austria, Prussia, and another member to be elected. Beust’s proposed alternation in the presidency seemed to him, however, very hard. “What will posterity say of me,” he sighed, “if, after Villafranca and Zurich, I make this concession also?” But even on this point he overcame his feelings, and induced the Emperor to give a conditional assent, and to agree that he would pay the price, if that would insure the success of the whole work, and if it was not to be accomplished in any other way.

Thus encouraged, Herr von Beust, on the 15th of October, laid his creation before all the German Courts. But he was forced to suffer a failure as complete as can possibly be conceived. The rejection of the plan by the party that favored a restricted Germany as well as by the Liberals was perfectly natural. “This,” cried Herr von Roggenbach, “is offering the German people a stone instead of bread.” But the friends and sympathizers, who favored an entire Germany, also refused to accept this offering.

“The thing,” said the King of Würtemberg, “is as unpractical as it is dangerous.” In Munich there was much annoyance that the third place in the Directory was not assigned once for all to Bavaria. Herr von Dalwigk, who was always thoroughly loyal to the cause, would have amended the outline by leaving out the main idea as incapable of being carried out. Hanover and Hesse-Cassel remained firm in their principle, that the Act of Confederation of 1815 was unalterable, unimprovable, and not to be questioned. And now let us look at the answers of the two Great Powers, the one as surprising to the author of the plan as the other was almost disastrous.

While Beust had been visiting the other Courts, at Vienna Herr von Biegeleben had recovered, and by taking a very decided stand he had led both Rechberg, who was hesitating, and the Emperor, who had all along been doubtful, to reject the project. In the case of Biegeleben, this was caused by a strong confidence in himself in common with Catholic zeal and the traditional pride of the Chancellorship at the Vienna Court. The official answer of Austria, given on the 5th of November, came unmistakably from his pen, which we shall often see in action after this.

In this answer the Austrian Government, using almost condescending language, declined to go into the undoubted merits and the great weaknesses of Beust’s creation. But it dwelt mainly upon the proposed alternation in the presidency of the Diet. It went far beyond Schwarzenberg’s counter-arguments in 1851, in the assertion that the national unity of Germany had its sole personification in Austria’s fixed presidency; if this were to yield to the shifting accidents of the alter­nate arrangement, the result would be the dismember­ment of Germany. This could only be thought of, if, in compensation for the overthrow of the acknowledged headship, a correspondingly broader and firmer basis were given to national unity by embracing the non­German possessions of Austria under the protection of the Confederation. Such talk as this meant favoring an entire Germany in the very loftiest style.

The deliberations at Berlin resulted in a decision of an opposite tendency. Even while returning from Konigsberg Herr von Patow had communicated to his colleagues the outline of a national constitution on the basis of “a restricted union,” but, in accordance with the disposition of those colleagues, he had received no answer in regard to the troublesome document. Imm­diately after, there came from Roggenbach the outline of a circular to the German Courts, which had been promised at Ostend; the King and the Ministry con­sulted upon it, and although Count Schwerin warmly declared that such a subordination of Prussia to a German Parliament would be the ruin of the country, the King decided to approve the circular in general, and only to make a reservation for the securing of Prussia’s position as a European Power. Then the text of Austria’s answer to Beust of the 8th of November was received, and not a little annoyance was felt at the significance therein attached to the presidency of the Diet: that which in 1816 had been treated without contradiction as a merely formal guidance in matters of business, was now to be elevated to a sort of supreme headship in all Germany.

Meanwhile Roggenbach, on the appearance of Beust’s plan, had for the time laid his own aside, but had, nevertheless, on the strength of their old Frankfort acquaintance, communicated it to Herr von Biegeleben in Vienna. He received an answer, dated November 27th. It began in a tone of ill-concealed excitement; but to the question whether Austria was now more ready than under Prince Schwarzenberg to admit the system of a restricted union and of a more comprehensive alliance, a passionate answer was given in the negative. “Austria,” wrote Biegeleben, “can never resign her position as the first Power in Germany ; by the side of a great national state she would have no future before her; such a state would speedily draw the Austrian Germans into its circle. Austria now stands at the head of Germany, and yet her monarchy rests on its own basis, and is not forced to depend upon a German Confederation for keeping her territories together: this alone is the fitting position for the Government which is centred at Vienna. Unfortu­nately we see that very soon again attempts at a Prusso-German union may be made: in that case a decided opposition will not be lacking.”

It was a variation on the old theme: Austria independent of Germany and yet the first Power in Germany. It was the same theory that had been uttered in almost the same words in the Congress in regard to the Confederate army. There was no choice left: either blind submission, or an open proclamation of the standpoint that was repudiated in Vienna.

With this in view, the King ordered an answer to Beust’s plan to be prepared. In this it was declared that the German Confederation was an international league of states independent and very different from one another; Prussia keenly desired the continuance of this league, and for that very reason was anxious that its powers should be kept within the narrowest limits possible ; whoever wished for anything better than this on German soil, could obtain it only by the voluntary association of similar states in a restricted union within the more comprehensive alliance; that is, by the estab­lishment of a federation within the confederacy.

On the 20th of December, 1861, this communication was sent to Dresden, and it was made public immediately after. It was no proposition, no appeal, no outline of a constitution: it was nothing more than an expres­sion of opinion about the way to a really valuable Confederate reform. But coming from the source it did, it was sufficient to produce a general explosion of passion on the opposite side.

Like an ant-hill disturbed by the gardener’s stick was the rushing and hurrying of despatches and messages among the Courts of the Lesser States. “How?” cried they. “ Prussia desires a more restricted union ? She returns to the abominable ideas of the Union and of the Assembly in the Cathedral of St. Paul? It is true the communication says nothing of Prussia’s being at the head of the Empire, of the mediatization of the Lesser States, of the exclusion of Austria, of a Demo­cratic parliament; but in the word Union, as in the box of Pandora, all evil is contained. In a case like this, the thing to do is, to make a stand at the very begin­ning, to hold the position firmly, and to act together.”

Some relief was felt, however, when, in January, 1862, it was learned that Austria thought the occasion serious enough to require that she herself should undertake the leadership in the contest About the middle of the month, Count Rechberg came back from a journey to Venice. He told the Prussian ambassador that he would enter into no discussion of the communication of December 20th, because by so doing he might endanger the good understanding in regard to Hesse-Cassel; but at the same time he took measures to bring about a demonstration, as imposing as possible, against the Prussian heresy. For his easily-excited feelings were this time thoroughly aroused.

“That communication,” he declared to the ambassador from Baden, “is an unexampled challenge on the part of Prussia, an undissembled summons to revolution. After such a proceeding, the next thing for Austria to do, would be to take up the gauntlet, and by an open and decided programme of opposition to gather the majority of the German Nation about herself. We still hesitate about doing this, because in that case the breach with Prussia would be unavoidable, and a civil war would be proclaimed. But Austria can no longer look on, while Prussia seeks to oust, by perfidious intrigues, the Imperial State from Germany.

The angry speeches of Rechberg were echoed by Herr von Schmerling, the Minister of the Interior, whose newspaper (Der Botechafter) had already opened with savage articles the campaign against Prussia. “I will not justify all this violence,” he said; “but it is the natural consequence of the Prussian challenge.”

The Austrian ambassadors at the Lesser Courts were summoned to Vienna; a rising Austrian diplomatist, Count Biome, then visited those Courts; the result of his consultations there, was a note, dated the 2d of February, which was addressed on the same day and in the same terms by seven Governments—Austria, the four Kingdoms, Darmstadt, and Nassau — to the Cabinet at Berlin. In this note the wickedness of his ideas was held up before the Prussian sinner; he was emphatically reminded of the failure that had formerly attended such attempts; an energetic protest was entered against any limitation of the sovereignty of German Princes; and conferences were demanded in regard to the establishment of a Confederate directory and of an assembly of delegates. Count Bernstorff answered this on the 14th of February very coolly, denying in a few words the accusations that had been brought, and declining to take any part in conferences carried on on a hopeless basis.

In connection with this correspondence, the Hanoverian Minister, Count Platen, observed to the Prussian ambassador that King George, who had been hitherto opposed to any change in the Confederate Constitution, had been forced only by Prussia’s action to adopt the standpoint of the note of the 2d of February. Platen said that he himself had hitherto always defended Prussia’s interests, but was now obliged to declare that Hanover was firmly allied with the Confederates of Wurzburg, and must be counted among the opponents of Prussia.

Thus the conflict between the party favoring an entire and that favoring a restricted Germany now showed itself among the Governments as it had hitherto done among the people; and on the side of those who favored an entire Germany, at least, warnings had not been lacking, that any farther step of Prussia along the path she had entered would occasion a declaration of war. In order to make the situation as difficult as possible for the Prussian ruler, at the same with this defection of the German Princes, the internal conflict in regard to the military reforms increased in violence, in a way excluding every prospect of an amicable settlement.

Immediately after the close of the session of the Parliament, the extreme Left of the Lower House had constituted itself a “German Progressist” party, and had circulated its programme in all parts of the country. This consisted of complaints of the half-heartedness and weakness of the Ministry, and of an appeal for the election of men that would stand forth with energy and determination for the just demands of the people. This was explained to mean open war against the Upper House, without a remodelling of which no law of a liberal tendency could be passed; a refusal of any consent to the new arrangement of the army, till a law had settled the continued existence of the militia, a two years’ term of service, and by this means a diminution of the taxes; and finally, a desire that the Government should without delay take vigorous steps for the calling of a German Parliament and the creation of a Prusso-German central authority.

This last stipulation at once calls forth the question, how it was possible to urge the Government to a policy in German affairs that implied a great war at the very outset, and at the same time to deny them the most necessary means for such a war, an effective army? The answer to this is, that the party had no belief in any war on account of the German question. Considering the results obtained by the National Association, the sentiments of many of the German Chambers, and the agitation everywhere carried on for German Unity, they thought that if Prussia could only gain the favor of the German people, the masses and the Chambers would soon compel the reluctant Governments to yield and follow her plans ; but the first condition of this was, that Prussia should show herself thoroughly liberal in internal affairs, should establish a constitution in a liberal spirit, and, above all, should turn her back upon a measure so highly unpopular and reactionary as the strengthening of the standing army. Certainly, any one who remembered the attitude of Austria in 1850, the hatred of Prussia manifested by the people of Suabia and Bavaria in 1859, the hostility universally displayed by the Clerical party to all efforts in the direction of a restricted Germany, could not listen to these speeches of a vague enthusiasm without anxiety.

Nevertheless, the majority of what had formerly been the Ministerial party kept drawing nearer and nearer to the party of Progress. The appeal, which the former issued to the electors, differed from that issued by the latter, not in the matter of its demands, but in hardly anything more than the indication of somewhat more prudence in the methods to be pursued, of a reluctance to proceed at once to violent measures. The mass of the people throughout the country showed no great enthusiasm for the retention of the militia in the regular army, nor for the inspiring thought of German Unity; but the alluring watchwords of a two years’ term of service and diminished taxes found an echo everywhere. The result of the elections on the 6th of December was a complete overthrow of the Conservatives, whose strength was reduced to twenty-four votes, and a great triumph of the Progressist party and their friends, the moderate Liberals, who had every prospect of controlling a majority in the new House.

The Government, filled with a desire to arrive at an amicable arrangement, immediately after the opening of the session, which took place on the 14th of January, 1862, brought in the draft of a law in regard to the obligation to serve, as had been requested by the former House, and announced further economies in the expenses of the army. Drafts of laws were also produced in regard to the abolition of the proprietary police and the introduction of a liberal arrangement of districts; another draft, in regard to the Chamber of Accounts, was intended to establish as a permanent law the method which had been generally adopted there in dealing with the budget; and finally, a fourth draft was brought forward, which, by a change in the provision of the Constitution that gave the right of impeaching a Minister to either House of Parliament, made that right dependent upon a common resolution of both Houses.

The general impression of these propositions upon the deputies was not very favorable. It was said that the two liberal laws would certainly be thrown out by the Upper House; so far from there being any mention of a remodelling of that House, its consent was now to be made necessary before a Minister could be impeached. The balance of the proposed drafts of laws, they said, inclined, therefore, to the side of the reactionary party; and for such a return as this the country was asked to take upon itself the three years’ term of service and the expense of the new regiments!

Nor was the Majority better satisfied with the management of foreign affairs and its results, in spite of the assurances held out in the speech from the throne that the path hitherto chosen in German matters would be persisted in. In the very first sessions motions were brought forward for explicit statements concerning Hesse-Cassel, as well as concerning Confederate reform, which were referred to special committees. In regard to Hesse-Cassel two forms of a motion were considered by the committee, both decidedly hostile to the Elector, but one couched in comparatively moderate terms, the other much more violent.

Count Bernstorff, who had with joy found Austria ready for common action in this matter, in spite of all previous disputes, for that reason besought the committee to adopt the milder form, but only succeeded with difficulty in bringing about a combination of the two propositions to the following effect: “It is urgently requested that the Government will use all possible means for the complete restoration of constitutional rights in Hesse-Cassel.” This was accepted in the House by an overwhelming majority. As for Count Bernstorff, the deputies did not speak of him with great respect. He had, they said, about as much courage and energy as his predecessor, Schleinitz; he employed no means but diplomatic trickery, and was frightened at every open and energetic expression of the popular will.

Meanwhile, on the 14th of February, the notes of the seven Governments, mentioned above, had been received by Prussia and answered in the negative. The Majority in the House did not indeed find fault because the Government had not answered the notes with cannon, but they were now all the more urgent that that course should be pursued, which, according to their opinions, could alone lead to safety,—the peaceful gaining over of the German people by an open declaration of the entire plan of a restricted Germany.

The committee to which this matter had been referred adopted a resolution on the 25th of February, which emphasized in sufficiently plain terms the claim of the German nation to the Imperial Constitution of 1849, briefly and roundly denied the legal existence of the Diet, which had been abolished in 1848, and could not be restored without the consent of the popular representatives in the different countries, and thus arrived at the following motion: “That the House considers it necessary to form a more comprehensive alliance with Austria and a restricted union with the other States, which latter shall have Prussia at its head and shall have a German parliament; the Government should make this openly the object of their policy, and should at once seek to realize it by mutual understandings with the other German states.”

The Ministry saw in these declarations a serious danger to its German policy. The majority even of its Liberal members had only with reluctance agreed to the communication of December 20th, which, by its suggestions of German Unity, had so sorely disturbed German unanimity. And now were they to be called on to protest against the legality of the Diet, which Prussia, like all the other German Governments, had recognized in 1851, and the contributions to which had since that time been granted yearly by the Prussian Parliament and by all the German Chambers? The committee was therefore informed that the whole motion was calculated to defeat its own object; it would call forth and strengthen opposition everywhere, and would render useless the efforts of the Government for a Confederate reform that was really attainable. The answer of the committee was an unconditional persistence in their determination and the bringing of their proposals before the whole House.

This action caused intense irritation on both sides. The Government felt that it would be impossible to get along for any length of time with an assembly so violent in its demands, and at the same time so inconsiderate; what term could be applied to their action in bitterly opposing the strengthening of the army and at the same time making requirements which, if yielded to, would at once be the signal for an attack by the Confederation and a war with Austria and South Germany?

On the other hand, the conviction had become established in the minds of the deputies, that the existing Ministry, whether of Bernstorff or Schleinitz, was hovering without vigor or energy around the great problems of Prussian power and honor, and drew back in fear before every lofty aim and every bold decision. If, at the time of the election agitation in the autumn, there had still remained a hope of a decided policy that should aim at acquiring for Prussia an honorable position in Europe, there was now an end of that illusion; but equally surely was there an end of any thought of consenting to the new regiments of the line, which would be employed only in an idle service of parade.

At this time every hope of an understanding in the committee on military matters also vanished. Whatever else may have been satisfactory about the Government’s proposition, the committee remained firm in the position that everything was unessential, so long as a concession was not made in regard to the two years’ term. At length, on the 5th of March, Herr von Roon made a final statement, that the Government could not accede to this innovation, but must adhere to the legal condition of things, a three years’ term. Upon this the Majority persisted in their resolution to strike out from the budget the cost of the new formations in the army. “You talk about the Law of 1814,” they said. “Very well, we will use our rights in regard to the budget. You call out soldiers and form battalions, that is your privilege. We refuse you the money necessary for their support, that is ours.”

Just at this time an occasion offered itself for insuring the effect in detail of such a determination. On the 6th of March came the report of the committee that had been appointed to consider the draft of the law concerning the Chamber of Accounts. The most important point of this report was the legal confirma­tion of the habitual practice, according to which, the statement of the budget contained only the sums total under the different main headings and the Government was not bound by any designated allotment of the appropriations carried into details. In opposition to this the deputy Hagen moved to specialize the statement even for the current year; that is, to make detailed allotments by which the Government should be bound. The motion was directed, as was shortly after openly declared, against the military plans of the administration. It was desired to prevent the Government from saving enough out of the large appropria­tions under the various main headings to keep the new formations in the army on foot. Although the Minister of Finance declared it impossible to apply such an arrangement to the statement of 1862 then under con­sideration, promised to carry out the specialization himself for 1863, and at the conclusion of his speech clearly implied that the continuance in office of the Cabinet depended upon the vote, the House adopted Hagen’s motion, one hundred and seventy-seven against one hundred and forty-three.

This was an open declaration of war, on the part of the House, against the entire plan of the military reforms, and it was received with approval and delight in all parts of the country. It was the signal for the close of the new era.

The Liberal Ministers had now in the Lower House only a small minority on their side, and in the Upper House they were detested as much as ever. Prince von Hohenzollern had already practically withdrawn, and Herr von Auerswald had been long an invalid. On the 8th of March the whole Cabinet offered its resignation to the King. The King, however, did not accept it, but expressed his confidence in his Ministers, and asked them to advise him as to the measures that should be taken under the circumstances. They were all agreed as to the first: the Lower House must be dissolved; and this appeared all the more desirable, since on the 11th of March the debate on the German question was to come on, which the Government desired above all things to avoid. On that very day, the 11th, the dissolution took place.

But as to what was to be done next, the different elements of the Cabinet disagreed. In order to proclaim to public opinion, now so excited, the favorable disposition of the Government, Count Schwerin proposed that the draft of the law concerning the arrangement of districts should be further adapted to the wishes of the Liberal Majority. Herren von der Heydt and von Roon, however, pointed out that this would carry with it the risk of a loss of the friendship of the Upper House, so important for the military reforms. And on general principles they held that, after recent occurrences, no good results could be obtained from the Lower House by yielding, but only by firmness. The King thought that, step by step, too much advance had been made toward the Left; he was afraid of finally abandoning a conservative basis entirely, and therefore rejected Schwerin’s proposal. The immediate result was the definitive resignation of the Liberal Ministers, Auerswald, Schwerin, Patow, Bernuth, and Count Pückler.

Roon, Von der Heydt, who now became Minister of Finance, and Count Bernstorff, remained. The presidency of the Ministry was assumed by the President of the Upper House, Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen; and in the place of those who had resigned, Herren von Jagow, von Mühler, von Holzbrink, and the Counts zur Lippe and von Itzenplitz were appointed. A thoroughly conservative Cabinet was thus opposed to the radical tendencies of the future Lower House.